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Executive Summary
In 1972, Congress adopted the modern Clean Water Act (CWA), establishing federal,
uniform standards for protecting the nation’s waterways. The law established a process for
limiting polluting emissions, under which state and federal environmental agencies grant
permits to polluters based on local waterways’ uses and pollution loads. Just as important,
the law created a mechanism for federal and state enforcement of those permits.
Significantly, the CWA allows the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to delegate
permitting and enforcement to state environmental agencies, and by virtue of such
delegation, the Maryland of Department of the Environment (MDE) enforces federal
water pollution standards in the state. This report evaluates MDE’s enforcement of the
CWA and offers solutions to improve and reinvigorate the program. Those conclusions
and recommendations are based on research that draws on publicly available information,
including MDE’s Annual Enforcement and Compliance Reports; a review of scholarly
research on effective enforcement program design; and a series of interviews conducted with
stakeholders across the state and a meeting with MDE enforcement staff.
Findings
The report draws three significant conclusions:
1. Funding. MDE is drastically underfunded. For example, the overall workforce
budget for the Water Management Administration (WMA) between 2000 and 2009
declined from $3.39 million to $3.16 million. When adjusted for inflation, this
decline is nearly 25 percent and coincides with a doubling of permits-in-effect. As a
result, the agency does not have enough resources to effectively fulfill the core mission of the CWA and state water quality laws. The funding shortages are especially
pronounced with respect to the enforcement workforce and the number of inspections. The total number of WMA inspector positions, including both filled and
vacant positions, has decreased by 12 percent, while the number of active, full-time
inspectors has decreased by 25 percent. Each inspector in the WMA is responsible
for 1,184 permits as of 2009, triple the number of permits per inspector in 2000.
Funding shortages also dramatically curtail the ability of MDE’s legal counsel to
pursue and effectively litigate enforcement actions. Nearly 40 percent of MDE’s
referrals for legal action from 2009—325 of 816 cases—are still awaiting action by
the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (OAG). While these attorneys report
to the Attorney General, their positions are located within MDE’s budget.
2. Program Design. Regardless of funding shortfalls, MDE has not designed its
enforcement program to effectively deter dischargers from violating the CWA
and state water quality laws. MDE relies primarily on paper reviews of Discharge
Monitoring Reports (DMRs) to assess compliance, overlooking the importance of
physical, onsite inspections that may reveal violations or problems not disclosed in
such reports. Across the board, MDE has settled for strikingly low penalties, and its
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
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penalty policy fails to recover the violator’s economic benefit from noncompliance.
Between 2000 and 2009, the average penalty that the WMA obtained per enforcement action for all its water permitting programs is approximately $1,260, around 5
percent of the maximum penalty per day authorized under
the CWA, as enacted, and 12.6 percent of the maximum
Figure 1: Pollution Contribution
penalty authorized per day under Maryland law. MDE also
to the Bay by Sector
fails to fully disclose the range of enforcement actions taken
NITROGEN
by local programs with delegated enforcement authority,
resulting in an incomplete picture of enforcement activities
across the state.
3. Citizen Suits. MDE fails to take advantage of citizen suits
to supplement its own enforcement actions and to maximize its limited resources. MDE’s institutional mentality
precludes citizen suits from proceeding by preempting these
lawsuits and denying citizens the opportunity to participate
or to represent their own interests once MDE takes over the
case. According to some environmental interviewees and
officials, this attitude toward citizen suits has provoked an
atmosphere of tension and controversy among MDE staff
and the regulated community, as they question the validity
PHOSPHORUS
of this supplementary enforcement tool provided by Congress to give citizens access to the courts and to assist state
enforcement programs.
Ultimately, because MDE is starved for resources and has persisted
in carrying out an inadequately designed program, its CWA
enforcement program is ineffective at deterring noncompliance
across the spectrum of regulated sectors. In fact, funding gaps have
persisted for so long that, according to many we interviewed, MDE’s
staff has internalized an unacceptably low level of expectations
for the agency’s performance in enforcement. For example, MDE
relies primarily on paper inspections of self-monitoring reports
to determine compliance. Few, if any, credible experts in the
operation of a deterrence-based enforcement program, whether
in the government, the private sector, or among publicly-funded
organizations, would agree that paper inspections provide the
foundation for an effective enforcement program. Another example
is the backlog of case referrals awaiting assignment in the OAG,
indicating that even MDE’s weak efforts to verify compliance and
implement an effective deterrence-based enforcement program are
crippled by lack of legal representation.

SEDIMENT
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Stakeholder Interviews
As part of their research for this report, the authors conducted a series of interviews with
key stakeholders with varied and considerable experience in CWA enforcement to determine
how they perceive MDE’s enforcement program and to help identify the program’s
strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in enforcement. The authors requested interviews with 20
stakeholders, who together represent a diverse group of current and former federal, state,
and local government officials; members of the regulated community; and members of
public interest groups. The findings are drawn from interviews with the 16 stakeholders
who agreed to participate.
In general terms, interviewees reached a consensus on the resource limitations that plague
MDE’s enforcement program and the OAG’s ability to pursue cases referred to it by MDE.
They also agreed generally that criminal enforcement could be increased for particularly
willful and egregious violations when a criminal law is clearly violated. Interviewees
disagreed on many other issues, however, including the institutional and permitting aspects
of MDE’s enforcement program, the nature of MDE’s enforcement approach and actions,
the role and effectiveness of citizen suits in enforcement, and the role of EPA.
Themes emerging from the interviews included:
• Evaluations of MDE’s enforcement program revealed it was weak for four
reasons: resource limitations on enforcement; institutional limitations on enforcement; weaknesses in the permitting program; and the nature of enforcement actions
taken by MDE.
• Nearly all interviewees lamented the lack of financial resources available to
MDE and appreciated the challenge faced by MDE staff being asked to do
more with less money. One industry interviewee pointed out a basic dilemma:
Maryland “can’t keep diverting resources and adding more statutory requirements
and expect things to improve.”
• All interviewees agreed that MDE should be the primary enforcer for violations of Clean Water Act requirements in Maryland with citizen suits and EPA
taking a secondary role, if any.
• Nearly all interviewees expressed dismay at the lack of inspectors and the
lack of inspections in MDE’s enforcement program and cited a need to increase both. At least two industry interviewees suggested MDE should hire more
inspectors to catch such errors and to identify specific violations, rather than relying
on enforcement efforts that overreach because MDE lacks the inspectors to review
each entity.
• Some officials and environmental interviewees lamented the low penalties assessed by MDE and their negligible impact on deterrence.
• Interviewees expressed divergent views on the role of citizen suits in enforcement. All environmental interviewees and some officials expressed the view that
citizen suits are a critical tool in enforcing the law and that they help drive MDE’s
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
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enforcement. They favored a larger role for citizen suits as a supplement to MDE’s
work and to leverage resources and characterized MDE’s attitude toward citizen
suits as unfavorable, if not outright hostile. Interviewees attributed this attitude to
insecurity, embarrassment, and favoritism toward the regulated community. Industry interviewees and some officials, on the other hand, were less approving of
citizen suits, characterizing them as “witch hunts” and finding that the suits impact
the timing of MDE enforcement, but not the outcome of that enforcement.
Industry interviewees characterized MDE’s enforcement as heavy-handed,
inconsistent, and disproportionate. In their opinion, most violations occur because the regulated community is unaware or ignorant of the regulations. They said
that MDE should provide more education and outreach and rely on more cooperative actions to reduce violations.
Interviewees had different and contrasting opinions on MDE’s relationships
with the regulated community and with public interest groups and their
impacts on enforcement. Both industry and environmental interviewees
expressed suspicion that MDE favors the other side. Both environmental and
industry interviewees recommended a more inclusive decision-making process.
Nearly every interviewee thought that MDE and the OAG should pursue
criminal enforcement actions for willful or flagrant violations. Opinions as
to the effectiveness of criminal enforcement actions in achieving deterrence varied. Some interviewees said that more criminal actions would send a clear message.
Others had difficulty evaluating the deterrent effect when cases are so difficult to
establish and civil penalties are much higher than they are in criminal cases.
Environmental interviewees and some officials attributed some enforcement
problems to the OAG, citing a lack of resources.  Some interviewees cited the
need for greater OAG review of permits before they are issued.

Key Recommendations
This report concludes that while Maryland has tough environmental laws, MDE lacks
the funding and does not currently have an adequate enforcement program to achieve
the goals set under the CWA and its own state laws. However, even without additional
funding, it could redesign its existing program and reallocate its limited resources to improve
enforcement of water quality laws. The authors offer the following recommendations:
Drastically underfunded, MDE does not have enough resources to
effectively fulfill the core mission of the CWA and state water quality laws. The funding
shortages are especially pronounced with respect to the enforcement workforce, which limits
how many inspections the agency is able to conduct. Both the regulated community and
environmental groups agree that MDE is overwhelmed with work and has limited resources
available to effectively enforce the law; they also agree that more inspectors are necessary to
develop a steady, judicious, systematic, and fair enforcement program. Going forward:
n Increase Funding.
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The Maryland General Assembly should provide additional funding to ensure a
vigorous enforcement program and should index increased funding levels to the rate
of inflation.
The Maryland General Assembly should authorize an increase in permitting fees to
ensure that the fees cover the basic cost of program administration.
The Maryland General Assembly should authorize increased penalties for violations
and should establish mandatory minimum penalties that are not subject to MDE
discretion.

Regardless of funding shortfalls, MDE has not designed its
enforcement program to effectively deter dischargers from violating the CWA and state
water quality laws. Going forward:
• In its penalty structure, MDE should seek to recoup the economic benefit achieved
by noncompliance from all defendants in enforcement actions.
• MDE should stop relying primarily on paper reviews of permit-holders’ DMRs to
set enforcement priorities and should increase the frequency of physical, on-site
inspections.
• MDE should reevaluate the balance of judicial enforcement actions and administrative enforcement actions and carefully consider which route is better, based on factors such as the difference in maximum available penalties or past experience with
similar cases or in similar venues.
• MDE should conduct an analysis of the most significant causes of Bay pollution
and select and inspect on an annual basis the largest dischargers or a random sample
of discharges in sectors with multiple small dischargers.
n Revise Program Design.

MDE fails to take advantage of citizen suits to supplement its
own enforcement actions and to maximize its limited resources. MDE often blocks citizen
suits by initiating enforcement action that preempts these lawsuits, and denies citizens the
opportunity to participate or to represent their own interests once MDE takes over the case.
• On a case-by-case basis, MDE should permit citizen suits to proceed in federal court
to supplement its own enforcement. Allowing enforcement actions to proceed in
federal courts would facilitate maximum penalty recovery and thus create maximum
deterrent effect.
n Embrace Citizen Suits.

Conclusion
The cost of MDE’s enforcement failures is very high for Marylanders, not just because the
Chesapeake Bay is so much a part of the state’s identity or because it is so widely used for
recreation, but because it is central to the health of the state’s economy. Maryland is not the
only the state that pollutes the Bay, of course, and it is not the only jurisdiction that enforces
water quality standards affecting the Bay. But in order to achieve the goal of restoring the
health of the Bay, Maryland must do its part. MDE must forcefully and publicly renew its
commitment to enforcement.
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short

Center for Progressive Reform

Page 7

Project Goals and Methodology
In December 2009, The Abell Foundation commissioned the Center for Progressive
Reform (CPR) to investigate the effectiveness of the Maryland Department of the
Environment’s (MDE) Clean Water Act (CWA) enforcement program. This report on
that investigation takes a detailed look at whether MDE’s efforts to enforce the CWA, in
conjunction with the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (OAG), and its response
to citizen enforcement initiatives, have contributed to the CWA’s goal of enhancing
and protecting water quality in the manner envisioned by Congress. Over a 15-week
period, CPR investigated MDE’s enforcement record with respect to major sources
of pollution to the Chesapeake Bay: sewage treatment plants, industrial and municipal
facilities, constructions sites, and concentrated animal feeding operations. This report
identifies a series of recommendations to revitalize and reinvigorate enforcement of CWA
requirements in Maryland.
The research for this report was compiled and co-authored by CPR Member Scholar
Robert Glicksman, the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law at the
George Washington University School of Law in Washington, D.C., and Yee Huang, CPR
Policy Analyst. Professor Glicksman is a nationally recognized expert in Clean Water Act
enforcement. He has recently co-authored Pollution Limits and Polluters’ Efforts to Comply: The
Role of Government Monitoring and Enforcement (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2010), a
detailed examination of nationwide Clean Water Act enforcement.
The authors relied on three methods to gather the information reported here: publicly
available online sources and reports; a review of scholarly literature on enforcement
mechanisms, effectiveness, and design; and interviews with 16 key stakeholders in Maryland.
The authors sent MDE a draft copy of this report and met with several members of the
enforcement staff. MDE’s response is included as appendix A, (see page 58).
The enforcement statistics and other data contained in this report are drawn from MDE’s
Annual Enforcement and Compliance Reports from FY 2000 to FY 2009. Other sources
used and available online include: reports from the Maryland Office of Legislative Audits,
the federal Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional Research Service, as
well as Keeping Pace: Maryland’s Most Important Environmental Problems and What We Can Do to
Solve Them, a 2002 report by the University of Maryland Environmental Law Clinic, and the
2007 Maryland Transition Work Group Report on Environment and Natural Resources.
To better understand how MDE’s enforcement program operates on the ground, CPR
conducted a series of interviews with stakeholders across Maryland. Interview participants
were asked to respond to a series of open-ended and general questions about the
enforcement of Clean Water Act requirements in Maryland, particularly with respect to
efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay. To encourage a candid dialogue, participants were
informed that their specific statements during the interview would remain confidential but
that the list of interviewees would be made public. That list is included in the Interview
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
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Findings section. The authors made every effort to consult a balanced and diverse group
of stakeholders in order to ensure that the perspectives of state and local governments,
regulated industries, and public interest groups were fully represented, and the authors
believe they achieved this fundamental goal.
Ultimately, because MDE is starved for resources and has persisted in carrying out an
inadequately designed program, its CWA enforcement program is ineffective in creating the
appropriate level of deterrence against noncompliance by the full range of regulated entities.
Funding gaps have persisted for so long that, according to many interviewees, MDE’s
staff has internalized an unacceptably low series of expectations for their performance in
enforcement by, for example, primarily relying on paper inspections of self-monitoring
reports to determine compliance. Few, if any, credible experts in the operation of a
deterrence-based enforcement program, whether in the government, the private sector,
or among publicly-funded organizations, would agree that primary reliance on paper
inspections results in an effective enforcement program. As troubling, a backlog of 325 case
referrals awaiting assignment in OAG indicates that even MDE’s unacceptably weak efforts
to verify compliance and implement an effective deterrence-based enforcement program are
crippled by lack of legal representation.
Given gaps in existing record-keeping, it is difficult to assess in any reliable, quantitative
manner how these dramatic weaknesses in the enforcement program translate into pollution
in the Chesapeake Bay. However, all Maryland stakeholders concerned about restoring
the Bay to the point where it is once again a vibrant, healthy, and internationally renowned
natural resource would do well to put inadequate enforcement of existing law at the top of
their list of priorities for reform. Stakeholders interviewed generally concluded that MDE
is in the “middle of the pack” of states in the Bay region where enforcement is concerned.
If these perceptions are correct, the state can do better. It is critically important to the
health of state residents and the quality of the environment that the political leadership
in Maryland and at MDE commit to taking the steps that will allow it to lead the region in
CWA enforcement efforts.
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Maryland’s Waters: An Overview
Maryland has more than 7,000 miles of coastline and thousands
of stream and river miles and lake acres, and the Chesapeake Bay
is the crown jewel of Maryland’s natural resource heritage. Nearly
the entire state lies within the Bay’s watershed. The Bay provides
a rich source of economic and aesthetic wealth for the state
from fishing, tourism, and recreation. Unfortunately, because of
pollution, the health of the Bay is tenuous—improved from its
condition in the 1980s, but still far short of what Bay scientists
consider healthy. The primary pollutants in the Bay are nitrogen,
phosphorous, and sediment. In appropriate quantities, nitrogen
and phosphorous are beneficial nutrients. In excess, however,
these nutrients accumulate in the Bay and contribute to algal
blooms and dead zones during the summer months.
Agriculture is the largest source of each pollutant, contributing
38 percent of the nitrogen, 45 percent of the phosphorous,
and 60 percent of the sediment to the Bay. Agriculture makes
up 25 percent of the land use in the watershed, and pollution
from agricultural runoff is often the least expensive to reduce.
Unfortunately, regulation of agricultural runoff is inconsistent,
and much of it escapes regulation under either federal or state
water pollution control laws.

Figure 2:

Figure 3:

Nitrogen Loadings by State

Phosphorus Loadings by State

Runoff from the urban and suburban sectors is another
major contributor of pollutants to the Bay and is particularly
troublesome because it is the only increasing source of pollution.
As land is urbanized and converted to asphalt or concrete
surfaces, and as construction sites alter the topography, the natural
surfaces lose the ability to absorb water naturally through the ground. These impervious
surfaces channel concentrate water flow, washing contaminants, including sediment and oil
and gas residue from roads, into local waterways, especially during heavy rains. During the
1990s, the population in the Bay increased by 8 percent, while the impervious surface in the
Bay watershed increased disproportionately, by 40 percent. As the population continues to
grow, impervious surface area will only increase, highlighting the importance of wet weather
water quality control.
Maryland contributes approximately 20 percent of the nitrogen and phosphorus pollution
in the Bay. Because Maryland has a long cultural and economic history of benefitting from
some of the most scenic and bountiful segments of the Chesapeake Bay, it has always
acknowledged a deep stake in the process of restoring contaminated and degraded resources.
A 2004 estimate by the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Blue Ribbon Finance Panel estimated the
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
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Figure 4:

Figure 5:

Sources of Nitrogen in Maryland

economic value of the Bay to over $1 trillion annually. The state
has passed a series of laws intended to strengthen restoration
efforts, including the Chesapeake Bay Restoration Act and
the Maryland Healthy Air Act. Despite these efforts, and the
expenditure of billions of dollars in federal aid over the past
20 years, water quality and the health of precious ecosystems,
including fishing resources, within the Bay have not improved
during this period. The Chesapeake Bay Program, a consortium
of the Bay Watershed states, has missed high-profile deadlines
for lowering pollution in the Bay and restoring natural resources,
especially with respect to nutrient loading. Restoration of the
Chesapeake Bay requires a strong, committed enforcement
program in Maryland and in all Bay states.

Sources of Phosphorus in Maryland
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The Clean Water Act: Enforcement Structure
Government Enforcement: Two Approaches
The 1972 Clean Water Act (CWA) fundamentally restructured the legal mechanisms for
protecting the nation’s waters. It established a water pollution control strategy based on the
premise that prohibiting the discharge of pollutants without a permit that imposes stringent
controls on polluting sources is the best way to improve water quality. The heart of the CWA’s
implementation and enforcement strategy is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) program. All point sources—specific, identifiable sources of pollution—
must obtain a NPDES permit and comply with the limits on discharges (called effluent limits)
that it sets. Those limits are based on both the source’s capability to reduce its discharges
using the best available pollution control technology and supplemental controls needed to
achieve levels of water quality that protect the public health and welfare and enhance water
quality. Each NPDES permit specifies the frequency with which permit holders must submit
Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs), or the results from self-monitoring.
By law, EPA may delegate to states the authority to administer the NPDES permit program
if the state establishes a program that satisfies the minimal requirements established in the
CWA. EPA may also withdraw that delegation of authority if a state fails to administer the
program in compliance with CWA requirements. If EPA withdraws authority for a state
program, it must administer a federal permit program in the affected state.
The adoption of environmental quality laws, of course, does not of itself protect the
nation’s waters. Achievement of statutory environmental protection goals depends on
rigorous enforcement. The CWA establishes two primary enforcement mechanisms:
1. Civil and criminal enforcement actions by the government, either EPA or a
state with delegated authority; and
2. Civil enforcement actions by citizens acting as private attorneys general to
supplement governmental enforcement initiatives.
At the time the CWA was passed, Congress recognized that even the best designed and
most well-intentioned enforcement programs could not and would not catch all violations.
Resource limitations preclude federal and state officials from identifying and pursuing all
instances of regulatory violations. Aware of these limitations, and intent on providing a
safeguard against excessive alignment by regulators with the interests of those they regulate,
Congress included citizen suit provisions to supplement government enforcement initiatives.
The CWA’s citizen suit provision serves as a safety net to catch violations that elude
detection or enforcement by federal and state regulators.
The CWA vests concurrent jurisdiction in both the federal and state governments to enforce
discharge limits and related permit responsibilities. The CWA delegates to EPA fundamental
oversight responsibilities but gives a state the first opportunity to address alleged violations
Failing the Bay: Clean Water Act Enforcement in Maryland Falling Short
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of the permits it issues. If EPA discovers that a discharger has violated the terms of a
NPDES permit, EPA must first notify the discharger and the state. The state then has a 30day period to take appropriate enforcement action against the discharger, after which EPA
must issue an administrative compliance order or refer the case to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) for pursuit of a formal, civil enforcement action. The CWA allows EPA to bypass
state enforcement, however, by issuing an administrative compliance order or referring the
violation to the DOJ without waiting for the state to act.
Government enforcement of laws such as the CWA generally follows one of two models:
deterrence-based or cooperative enforcement. Since the enactment of the CWA, EPA
has relied primarily on deterrence-based enforcement to achieve the law’s water quality
protection objectives, although it has used
cooperative approaches as well in recent
Deterrence-based enforcement
years.
is characterized by

four essential elements:

1. Sufficient, consistent, and regular compliance monitoring to
identify violators.
The Clean Water Act requires that regulated entities provide self-monitoring
reports of their discharges to the enforcement authority and the public.
These discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) disclose the pollution discharges
recorded by the entity’s monitoring systems. DMRs are an important tool in
any enforcement program. In addition to monitoring requirements, however,
the typical NPDES permit imposes a range of other crucial requirements on
facilities that may not be included in the DMR. For example, a review of
even properly completed DMRs would not reveal whether the equipment in
question was operating correctly, nor would it reveal whether the facility had
added unpermitted operations to its physical structure. Limiting compliance
monitoring to a paper review of DMRs cannot possibly form the foundation
for a viable enforcement program. As a practical matter, such reliance is the
functional equivalent of allowing companies to regulate themselves.
2. Timely initiation of enforcement actions against violators.
Once a violation is uncovered during a routine inspection of a regulated
entity, the enforcement authority must assess civil and, in appropriate cases,
criminal penalties against the owners and operators of the facility.
3. A mandate that the violator come into compliance with applicable
laws and regulations.
The CWA grants EPA and MDE ample authority to enjoin violators from
engaging in future violations and this injunctive relief must be designed to
establish a series of checks and balances to prevent recidivism.
4. Imposition of penalties that, at a minimum, eliminate any
economic benefit that the violator gained from violating the law
and that provide a deterrent for future violations.
All enforcement actions must recover the violator’s economic benefit of
noncompliance or “avoided compliance costs” during the entire period of
violations and, preferably, impose sufficient additional penalties to deter the
targeted violator and all similarly situated regulated entities from committing
future violations. Unless the government extracts from violators the economic
gains resulting from noncompliance, it will almost certainly be cheaper to
violate and pay any penalties assessed than it would be to comply, thereby
frustrating the essential underpinning of deterrence-based enforcement.

Deterrence-Based Enforcement

Deterrence-based enforcement is based
on the theory that those subject to legal
obligations weigh the costs and benefits
of complying with them. If the costs of
complying with the law are lower than the
costs of violating it, a rational regulated
entity will comply with the law, goes
the theory. If, however, the size of the
penalties for violation, discounted by the
probability that the government will pursue
them, makes it cheaper to violate than to
comply, a rational profit-maximizer will
choose noncompliance.
Deterrence-based enforcement
works, therefore, only if the threat of
enforcement is credible. Part of the
calculus involves assessing the likelihood
that the government will detect a
violation and decide to take enforcement
action. In assessing whether compliance
or noncompliance makes more sense,
regulated entities will discount the amount
of the penalties that may result from
enforcement by the probability that
enforcement will occur.
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The 2009 Enforcement Action Plan issued by EPA’s Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance describes well the outcomes deterrence-based enforcement seeks to
promote:
Effective enforcement programs create incentives for compliance by penalizing those who do not follow the law. They establish a level playing field
between those members of the regulated community who comply and those
who do not. Enforcement ensures fair treatment – companies that compete
against each other should not face wide disparities in treatment across the
country, such as mandatory minimum penalties for a violation in one state
and no enforcement in another.
EPA’s civil penalties policy emphasizes two components: (1) the gravity of the violation
and (2) recovery of any financial gain derived by the regulated entity from violating the
law (“benefit of noncompliance”). This policy is intended to ensure that violators gain
absolutely no financial benefit from violating the law.
Cooperative Enforcement

A second approach to enforcement has come into more frequent use in recent years.
Cooperative enforcement is based on the theory that businesses are inclined to comply with
the law because of political, social, and economic norms and pressures. These external and
internal forces reduce the need for the imposition of sanctions by enforcement agencies.
The proponents of this approach posit that violations occur because regulated entities, and
in particular small businesses, are not familiar with the multiple and complex regulations
in force. Under this approach, regulatory agencies provide advice and consultation
to businesses and the regulated community to prevent violations. When a violation is
identified, these agencies rely on cooperative approaches and voluntary efforts to bring
violators into compliance as quickly as possible.
The effectiveness of the cooperative, business-friendly enforcement strategies favored by
a number of states has yet to be proven. Few states have demonstrated improvements in
compliance or improved environmental conditions as a result of a shift toward cooperative
enforcement strategies. If a cooperative regime reduces incentives for compliance by
lowering the likely costs of noncompliance, reliance by state enforcement officials on this
regime could lead to higher rates of noncompliance by firms and increased public exposure
to harmful pollutants. It also could undermine the national uniformity Congress intended in
enacting the federal environmental laws if the penalties for noncompliance differ noticeably
from state to state based on the enforcement model that each state adopts.
Shortfalls in Funding

When EPA first started delegating federal authority to the states in the 1970s, it routinely
awarded federal grants to states to assist with the costs of the administrative infrastructure
required to implement the program. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, this funding gradually
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For more information on
deterrence-based enforcement:
• CPR, The States’ Role in Environmental Protection, http://www.progressivereform.org/perspDevolution.cfm;
• Joel Mintz, CPR, Environmental Enforcement:
What Works?, http://www.progressivereform.org/
perspEnvironenforce.cfm;
• Robert Glicksman and Dale Earnhart, Depiction
of the Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship
in the Chemical Industry: Deterrence-Based v.
Cooperative Enforcement, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl.
L. & Pol’y Rev. 603 (2007), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=952778; and
• David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based
Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality,
24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2000), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1547897.

declined, in large measure because of budget deficits at the federal level.
In recent years, states have been unable or unwilling to make up these
shortfalls, creating a major challenge for state enforcement programs.
Between fiscal years 1997 and 2006, federal funding for enforcement
efforts in the EPA regions declined in real terms by 8 percent. A 2009
Government Accountability Report (GAO) emphasized that federal
funding has not kept pace with inflation or the ever-growing list of
regulatory responsibilities.
In addition, the federal funds provided to the states and to EPA regions
to implement and enforce state permit programs have not accounted for
the current workload, including implementing basic statutory requirements
under the CWA, or broader goals and objectives in the EPA’s strategic
enforcement plan.1 For example, seeking to develop a more systematic,
data-driven method for budgeting and allocating resources that more
accurately reflected the resources needed by states to adequately fulfill
their CWA implementation and enforcement responsibilities, in 1998
EPA developed a tool to allow states to estimate the amount of resources
needed to fully implement the CWA. Due in part to resource constraints,
EPA did not implement this tool, despite the conclusion of independent
reviewers that it was sound and could have been useful.

A 2007 GAO report highlighted other obstacles to effective enforcement by federal and state
officials.2 EPA lacks basic information about state enforcement programs, including whether
states have enough enforcement personnel to meet the responsibilities the state undertook
when it received authority to administer the NPDES program. The GAO also found that
unclear communication of EPA planning and priority setting causes confusion within EPA
regional offices and state agencies. State officials complained of micromanagement by EPA
without explanation or consultation.
Citizen Suit Enforcement
Like most federal environmental statutes, the CWA contains a citizen suit provision that
empowers citizens and public interest organizations to bring enforcement actions against
dischargers for violating their permits.3 In creating this second track of enforcement by
“private attorneys general,” Congress reasoned that the ability to bring such lawsuits would
strengthen democratic values by allowing citizens to redress grievances; ensure that citizens,
as well as well-financed regulated entities, have access to the federal courts in matters
relating to implementation and enforcement of the CWA; and complement government
enforcement actions, particularly in situations where governmental action is deficient or
lacking.
The CWA’s citizen suit provision provides that any citizen may bring a civil action against
any person who is alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation or of an
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administrative compliance order.4 Before proceeding, however, the citizen must give the
Administrator of EPA, the state, and the alleged violator notice of the suit and must allow a
60-day period for the violation to be corrected. To help finance citizen suits, the court may
award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.
During the 60-day notice period, a state may initiate its own action against the violator.
In several instances, states have “over-filed” enforcement actions within this time frame
in state court. These cases are often pursued at the request of the violator, who solicits
state enforcement to shield itself from a citizen suit. If a state action commences and
continues to diligently pursue enforcement action, the only remaining option for the citizen
is to intervene in the suit at the state court level. The availability of opportunities for
intervention depends on state law.
Citizen suits have made a significant mark as an environmental enforcement tool. One
report found that between 1973 and 2002, citizens initiated actions that resulted in more
than 1,500 reported federal decisions.5 In the decade between 1993 and 2002, federal courts
averaged 110 civil environmental cases per year, approximately 75 percent of which were
citizen suits.6
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Maryland’s Clean Water Act Enforcement
Program
MDE implements the NPDES permitting program of the CWA through four programs:
•

Municipal and Industrial Surface Water Discharges, which covers traditional
discharges through a pipe into lakes, rivers, and streams from publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) and factories;

•

Pretreatment Industrial Discharges, which covers discharges from an industrial
plant into a POTW after pretreatment to lower chemical toxicity so that the POTW
is capable of adequately treating the waste;

•

Stormwater Management and Erosion & Sediment Control, which covers runoff from land and paved surfaces into storm drains; and

•

Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, which covers run-off from farm
facilities that raise more than a minimum number of certain types of livestock.

These programs are housed in MDE’s Water Management Administration (WMA), which
includes a Compliance Program as well as a range of federal and state water permitting
programs. For the sake of simplicity, the discussion below refers to these organizational
units as MDE, unless otherwise noted. In 2009, WMA had 46.4 full-time inspectors, who
were responsible for 54,942 permits in all its programs, including CWA permitting programs
and other state water law permitting programs. For CWA programs alone, 13,681 permits
were in effect in FY 2009.
MDE assigns priority for its sharply limited inspection resources to (1) sites that are subject
to complaints from citizens; (2) oversight of owners and operators that have violated selfmonitoring and self-reporting requirements in the past; and (3) oversight of owners and
operators in violation of the permitted effluent limits. MDE conducts DMR reviews and,
less frequently, site inspections to determine whether or not the facility or site meets the
criteria for significant noncompliance. The function of these reviews is to assess:
• Whether the facility has exceeded the federal threshold for significant noncompliance, which is a discharge of 20 percent or more above permitted levels for toxic
pollutants or a discharge of 40 percent or more above permitted levels for conventional pollutants;
• Whether illegal discharges have caused or could cause an adverse impact to public
health or the environment;
• Whether the violation represents willful, chronic, or recalcitrant behavior;
• Whether the plant owner or operator has deviated substantially from mandatory
permit terms or other binding documents; or
• Whether the violation is not corrected within 60 days of notification that a violation
is occurring.
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Table 1. Comparison of penalties under Maryland state law and the Clean Water Act
State of Maryland
Md. Envir. § 4-417

Clean Water Act
33 U.S.C. § 1319

Civil Penalty – First
Offense

Not exceeding $25,000 per day per violation
For CWA violations, not exceeding $10,000
per day per violation. See Md. Envt. Code
§ 9-342 & 9-342.1 (2010).

33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)
As enacted, not exceeding $25,000 per day per violation
For penalties effective after January 30, 1997, through March 15, 2004, not
exceeding $27,500 per day per violation1
For penalties effective after March 15, 2004, through January 12, 2009, not
exceeding $32,000 per day per violation
For penalties effective after January 12, 2009, not exceeding $37,500 per
violation per day

Civil Penalty –
Subsequent Offense

Additional civil penalty, up to $10,000 per
day per violation, not exceeding a total of
$100,000, considering penalty factors

n/a

Criminal

For the first violation, conviction of a
misdemeanor, and a fine not exceeding
$50,000 or by imprisonment not
exceeding 1 year, or both, and may be
enjoined from continuing the violation
For a subsequent violation, a fine not
exceeding $50,000 per day of violation
and imprisonment not exceeding 2 years,
or both

See below

Criminal Penalty –
Negligent Offense

n/a

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)
For the first violation, a mandatory minimum fine of not less than $2,500
nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or imprisonment of not
more than 1 year, or both
For a subsequent violation, a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of
violation or by imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both

Criminal Penalty –
Knowing Offense

n/a

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)
For the first violation, a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 3 years, or
both
For a subsequent violation, a fine of not more than $100,000 per day of
violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or both

Criminal Penalty –
Falsification of
Information &
Tampering with
Monitoring Devices

A fine not exceeding $10,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding 6 months,
or both

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4)
For the first violation, a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment
of not more than 2 year, or both
For a subsequent violation, a fine of not more than $20,000 per day of
violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 4 years, or both

Administrative

n/a

Class I Civil Penalty, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A)
As enacted, a fine not to exceed $10,000 per violation, and the maximum
amount shall not exceed $25,000
For penalties effective after January 30, 1997, through March 15, 2004, a
fine not to exceed $11,000 per violation; the maximum amount shall
not exceed $25,000
For penalties effective after March 15, 2004, through January 12, 2009,
a fine not to exceed $11,000; the maximum amount shall not exceed
$32,500
For penalties effective after January 12, 2009, a fine not to exceed $16,000;
the maximum amount shall not exceed $37,500
Class II Civil Penalty, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B)
As enacted, a fine not to exceed $10,000 per day per violation, and the
maximum amount shall not exceed $125,000
For penalties effective after January 30, 1997, through March 15, 2004, a
fine not to exceed $11,000 per day per violation; the maximum amount
shall not exceed $137,500
For penalties effective after March 15, 2004, through January 12, 2009,
a fine not to exceed $11,000; the maximum amount shall not exceed
$157,500
For penalties effective after January 12, 2009, a fine not to exceed $16,000;
the maximum amount shall not exceed $177,500

1

On January 12, 2009, the EPA’s Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule became effective. This rule adjusts EPA’s civil monetary penalties
for inflation. The adjustment is based on the Consumer Price Index published by the U.S. Department of Labor. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2009).
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For violations that MDE deems minor, such as record-keeping or reporting errors, it has
the discretion to allow the facility to correct a documented problem, either past or ongoing,
without taking formal action. Significant violations or repeated minor violations warrant
more serious legal action, which can include a combination of penalties, corrective orders,
stop-work orders or injunctions, and criminal sanctions.
Maryland law provides the statutory minimums for civil and criminal penalties, as well as
factors to determine the penalty amount.
MDE determines the size of administrative penalties on the basis criteria such as:
• Willfulness of the violation and pattern of violation by facility;
• Actual harm to the environment or human health;
• Cost of clean-up or restoration;
• Ability to control, reduce, or prevent the violation; and
• Degree of danger posed by the violation.
Like most other federal and state enforcement agencies, MDE reduces penalties on the basis
of good faith behavior by the violator, including prompt self-disclosure of the violation;
prompt and voluntary corrective action; the development of plans to prevent future
recurrence of the violation; and full cooperation with MDE to investigate the violation.
Noticeably missing from the list of factors used to determine the penalty amount is any
effort to recover the economic benefit of the violation to the violator. As discussed earlier,
the recovery of the violator’s economic benefit of noncompliance is essential to an effective
enforcement program.
Penalties may also take the form of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs), which
are environmental projects undertaken by violators that are not otherwise required by law in
lieu of penalty dollars. Between 2000 and 2009, MDE authorized a total of 31 SEPs with an
estimated value of $13,615,300. While SEPs are intended to achieve environmental benefits
that would not be achieved by traditional penalties, the same results may also be achieved
by issuing strong injunctive relief that makes parties clean up problems resulting from past
noncompliance and protect the environment through future compliance.
MDE also provides a variety of pre-enforcement compliance education and assistance.
For example, an inspector may identify a specific change that a regulated facility can
make to prevent a future violation, and encourage the facility voluntarily and in a timely
manner to correct the problem. Through the Permitting and Customer Services Office,
MDE also assists businesses that need permits or MDE approval to understand their legal
responsibilities.
Trends in Enforcement, 2000-2009
Under the Maryland Environment Code, section 1-301(d), MDE is required to publish an
annual report on its enforcement activities during the previous year. The following analysis
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is based on data from FYs 2000 to 2009 contained in MDE’s Annual Enforcement and
Compliance Reports, which are posted on MDE’s website.
One of the most striking aspects of these reports, when examined cumulatively, is the
overall decline in resources and a contemporaneous increase in permits and enforcement
responsibilities. The overall budget for MDE’s CWA enforcement workforce has decreased
by almost 25 percent since 2000, adjusted for 2009 values. While the FY 2009 budget
represents an increase from the lowest budget in 2007, the overall decrease coincides with
a doubling of permits in effect during the same period. Not surprisingly, the budget has a
significant impact on the number of inspectors.
Similarly, the total number of inspector
positions allocated, including both filled and
vacant positions, has decreased overall by 12
percent from a high of 63.3 positions in 2000
to a low of around 47.5 positions in 2007
and 2008. In 2009, the number of allocated
positions increased to 55.9. Even more
dramatic, however, is the overall decrease in the
number of filled, full-time inspector positions,
from 62 inspectors in 2000 to 46.4 inspectors
in 2009—a 25-percent decrease in active
inspectors. With the doubling of the number
of permits in effect, the decrease in full-time
inspectors means that roughly 1,180 permits
are in effect for each inspector, three times the
number of permits in 2000.
Moreover, MDE is settling for strikingly
low penalties. Overall, the average penalty
obtained per enforcement action in the
WMA over the past 10 years is approximately
$1,260. Not all of these actions fall under the
CWA, but it it is startling to consider that this
average is roughly 5 percent of the maximum
penalty per day authorized under the CWA,
as enacted, and roughly 12.6 percent of the
penalty amount authorized per day for CWA
violations Maryland law.

WMA: Enforcement Budget, Inspectors,
and Permits in Effect, FY 2000-2009

Figure 9:

Figure 10:

WMA: Enforcement Budget, Compliance Assistance,
and Enforcement Actions, FY 2000-2009

From 2000 to 2009, average penalties were
higher for municipal and industrial dischargers
with NPDES permits, averaging $8,265
per enforcement action. However, these
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are averages for enforcement actions. The penalty structure under both Maryland law
and the CWA provide for maximum daily penalties – enforcement actions often involve
violations that happen more than once. Under Maryland law, CWA violations are subject
to a maximum penalty of $10,000 per violation per day. Under the Clean Water Act and
subsequent adjustments for inflation, the currently penalty maximum is $37,500 per violation
per day. For example, if a polluter violates its permit for three days, it would be subject to
either a $30,000 maximum penalty amount under Maryland law or a $112,500 maximum
under federal law, depending upon which court the case was brought. While the number
of penalties issued in any given year does not necessarily reflect the effectiveness of MDE’s
enforcement program – a variety
Table 2. Water Management Administration: Enforcement Workforce
of factors can explain a high or
FY 2009
Year
Amount
Inspectors
Vacancies
Total
low collection rate – the average
Values2
Positions
penalty obtained per enforcement
Allocated
action in Maryland is notably
$4,231,965.33
2000
$3,396,824.00
62
1.3
63.3
less than the maximum penalties
$3,535,764.14
2001
$2,776,893.00
53.08
3.3
56.38
provided per day by law.
2002

$2,964,915.00

$3,535,764.14

49.5

3.3

52.8

2003

$3,085,703.00

$3,597,812.31

48.8

7.2

56

2004

$3,050,817.00

$3,464,865.68

48.3

3.8

52.1

2005

$2,841,357.00

$3,121,229.94

44.7

5.2

49.4

2006

$2,624,959.00

$2,793,406.89

44.7

6.7

51.4

2007

$2,572,869.00

$2,662,150.44

37.6

9.8

47.4

2008

$2,892,037.00

$2,881,747.78

41.5

6

47.5

2009

$3,164,632.00

46.4

9.5

Overall
2

$3,164,632.00
25%

25%

55.9
12%

These figures were adjusted by the authors according to the Bureau of Labor’s Consumer Price Index Calculator,
available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.

Table 3. Water Management Administration: Inspectors and Inspections

Year

No. of Permits
or Licenses in
Effect

Full-time
Inspectors

Permits Per
Inspector

No. of
Inspections

Inspections
Per
Inspector

2000

24,108

62

389

9,916

159.9

2001

29,061

53.08

547

9,106

171.6

2002

28,685

49.5

579

10,146

205.0

2003

35,136

48.8

720

12,491

256.0

2004

40,611

48.3

841

13,044

270.1

2005

37,691

44.7

843

13,322

298.0

2006

40,782

44.7

912

12,637

282.7

2007

40,438

37.6

1,075

12,134

322.7

2008

61,294

41.5

1,477

8,630

208.0

2009

54,942

46.4

1,184

7,536

162.4

In a press release on the FY 2009
enforcement and compliance
report, MDE heralded a 7-percent
increase in enforcement actions
and a 17-percent rise in sites
inspected, attributing these
increases to an initiative to
improve enforcement launched in
2007. The increase in enforcement
actions came primarily in sectors
unrelated to the CWA, such as
drinking water and radiological
health.
The 2009 report notes that,
despite this overall increase,
many enforcement actions are in
queue at the Attorney General’s
Office. The report acknowledges
that “legal staffing has not kept
pace,” and as a result, nearly 40
percent of MDE’s referrals—325
cases of 816 cases referred—are
still awaiting assignment to or
active attention from MDE’s legal
counsel. For the three MDE
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NPDES programs for which the annual reports include data, in 2009, 76 cases have been
resolved and 149 cases are ongoing. While MDE’s legal counsel reports to the Attorney
General, funding for their positions are located within MDE’s budget.
Municipal and Industrial Surface Water Discharges
(State and NPDES Permits)

Under the federal CWA and Maryland law, all industrial, commercial, or institutional facilities
that discharge wastewater directly into the waters of Maryland require a NPDES permit.
Additionally, concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) must obtain NPDES permits.
Between FY 2000 and FY 2009, the
Figure 6: Surface Water NPDES Permits and Inspections, FYs 2000-2009
number of permits in effect increased
sharply, primarily due to dramatic
increases in 2008 and 2009. In FY
2008 MDE began including all general
permits for stormwater associated with
construction activity in its calculation
of permits in effect. General permits
cover an entire category of polluter.
Permit holders need not apply for an
individual NPDES permit, but must
comply with the conditions attached
to the general permit for the industrial *In 2008 and 2009, MDE began including general permits in the total number of permits, causing
dramatic increases in those years.
category involved. The program
shows a gradual increase in the number
of site inspections, particularly between 2000 and 2007, but with significant drops in 2008
and 2009. The inspection coverage rate, as a result of the dramatic increase in the numbers
of permits in effect, dropped sharply in 2008 and 2009, resulting in an overall decline in the
inspection coverage rate. From 2000 to 2009, the average penalty per enforcement action was
approximately $8,265.
The number of inspections taken in this program is tied to the weather and the number
of wet weather incidents during a particular year. For example in FY 2003, an unusually
wet year, the enforcement report noted the increased attention to sewage overflows from
municipal sewer systems, which required an inspection of each overflow or spill report
received. More generally, reports emphasized that inspections of facilities with surface water
discharge permits are a priority and that this program is a high priority.
Pretreatment Industrial Discharges

MDE’s responsibility for regulating the discharge of wastewaters extends to regulating
wastewaters from industrial and other non-domestic sources discharged to publicly owned
treatment works. This oversight helps to ensure that these dischargers do not introduce
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Pretreatment Industrial Discharge Permits and Inspections

to municipal treatment works
wastewater that could harm the
works’ critical water infrastructure.

As of FY 2009, MDE has delegated
responsibility for enforcement
actions to 20 local pretreatment
programs that are responsible for
198 industrial sources. These local
pretreatment programs assume the
enforcement duties and authorities
of MDE, according to MDE’s
delegation agreement with EPA.
The enforcement actions taken by
these programs are not included
in MDE’s enforcement statistics. Instead, MDE compliance and enforcement efforts in the
pretreatment sector focus on monitoring delegated local pretreatment programs and industrial
dischargers that discharge to non-delegated local programs. This supervision requires a
significant commitment of resources and, given Maryland’s shortfalls in other areas and the
importance of controlling this type of discharge to the preservation of environmental quality,
this arrangement raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of locally delegated programs
in implementing CWA requirements.
Between FY 2000 and 2009, enforcement activity by MDE remained relatively steady, with
a nearly 100-percent inspection rate for the delegated authorities and industrial discharges
that receive permits directly from MDE. Compared to other programs, MDE oversees
relatively few facilities under this program. The number of enforcement actions is low.
When enforcement actions do occur, they are primarily compliance assistance activities.
From 2000 to 2009, this program took only 13 penalty and other enforcement actions, not
including compliance assistance. The average penalty per action was $22,935. Again, MDE’s
annual reports do not include information on enforcement activities by locally delegated
pretreatment programs, a crucial information gap.
Stormwater Management and Erosion & Sediment
Control for Construction Activity

The purpose of the stormwater program is to reduce the amount of sediment and other
pollution that flows into state waters from construction or land use activities associated
with urbanization. In Maryland, construction activity that disturbs more than 5,000 square
feet or more of land or results in 100 cubic yards or more of earth movement is required
to have stormwater management plans and erosion and sediment controls in place before
construction activities begin. MDE has delegated inspection and enforcement authority
for erosion and sediment control to 14 counties and 10 municipalities. The enforcement
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activities conducted by these
delegated authorities are not
included in MDE’s enforcement
statistics. Again, the effectiveness
and adequacy of MDE’s supervision
of delegated authorities requires
continued attention.

Figure 8:

Page 23

Stormwater, Sediment and Erosion Control Permits and
Inspections, FYs 200-2009

Under Maryland law, construction
sites with approved erosion and
sediment control plans must be
inspected once every two weeks
on average. The enforcement
reports freely concede inadequate
inspections and state that “[t]his
requirement is not being met due to workload.”
Between FY 2000 and FY 2009, the number of stormwater and erosion and sediment
permits in effect has steadily increased overall, despite a sharp drop in permits in effect in
2009. However, the number of sites inspected has slowly decreased. More telling, however,
is the sharp decline in the inspection coverage rate, which is calculated as the number of
sites inspected divided by the number of permits in effect. According to the reports, in the
early 2000s, this program experienced persistent problems with staff vacancies and with
resources and staff hours spent on transitioning to a new computer system. However,
during these years, MDE noted that the remaining inspectors were highly proficient and thus
maintained relatively stable inspection rates. The average penalty per enforcement action in
this program from 2000 to 2009 was $4,786.
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations

In 2009, a new permitting program became effective for large animal feeding operations
that qualify as either a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) under federal law
or a newly established Maryland animal feeding operation (MAFO). Prior to the CAFO
permitting program, farm operations were required to have Nutrient Management Plans
(NMPs) for farm operators that gross more than $2,500 annually or have 8,000 pounds or
more of live animal weight. Approximately 5,700 farm operations in Maryland are required
to have NMPs.
The Maryland Department of Agriculture (MDA) is the agency primarily responsible for
inspecting and enforcing farm operators’ compliance with NMPs. While not a traditional
enforcement authority, MDA has authority under the Water Quality Improvement Act
to enter farm facilities to take measurements, but farm operators strongly protest this
authority. After three citations from MDA, a farm facility in violation of its NMP will be
referred to MDE for further enforcement action, meaning that MDE is fairly far removed
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from enforcement of water quality from farm facilities. MDA’s enforcement program
consists of on-site inspections, analysis of self-reports by farm operators, and follow-up
from citizen complaints. MDA states that it conducts on-site inspections of 10 percent of
farm operations to determine compliance with NMPs. Little recent information on specific
enforcement activities is available.
The new CAFO permit is a separate and distinct program, enforceable by MDE. Whether
or not a farm facility falls under this new permitting program hinges, in part, on whether it
“proposes to discharge,” or is designed with a conveyance system to remove contaminated
runoff or wastewater from the production area to the surface waters of Maryland. If a farm
qualifies as a CAFO, it is required to obtain a Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plan
(CNMP) from the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service. If a farm qualifies as a
MAFO, it must obtain both an NMR and a conservation plan or a CNMP. All other farms
are still required to have NMPs, enforceable by MDA as described above, under Maryland
law. The CAFO program authorizes on-farm inspections and enforcement of water quality
problems by MDE.
Because this program is new, there are limited statistics regarding enforcement efforts. As of
March 2010, some 506 farms have submitted applications for CAFO status.
Gaps in MDE’s Annual Reports and Enforcement Data
The clearest observation in enforcement in Maryland is that resources have decreased at
the same time that the number of permitted facilities has increased dramatically. Fewer
inspectors are responsible for assessing compliance with more and more permits, and
inspection coverage rates are down, meaning more facilities slide by each year without
physical inspections.
Yet the statistics in MDE’s annual enforcement reports do not present a complete picture
because, although MDE offers explanations for variations from year to year, those
explanations do not fully or thoroughly detail MDE’s enforcement actions. Instead, the
reports use different definitions of site categories from year to year, making it difficult to
track trends. They also have crucial information gaps and reporting inconsistencies.
Significantly, the enforcement statistics in MDE’s reports do not include enforcement
activities conducted by other local delegated jurisdictions and vary depending on how
certain enforcement activities are counted. In Maryland, 20 publicly owned treatment works
have delegated enforcement authority over indirect industrial dischargers to their facilities.
However, MDE does not include this information in its annual reports. Both MDE and
the public would benefit from having this information available to determine whether these
delegated authorities are conducting appropriate enforcement actions.
The reports sometimes include DMR reviews in the number of sites inspected, even though
the sites are not physically inspected. This counting method increases the inspection
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coverage rate for individual programs, even though the number of physical site inspections
has not actually increased or, in some instances, has decreased. For the Municipal and
Industrial Surface Water Discharges, the inspection coverage rate from 2000 to 2007 is fairly
high, ranging from a low of 49 percent in 2000 to a high of 89 percent in 2007. However,
in 2008 and 2009, MDE separated the number of sites physically inspected from the sites
audited but not inspected (previously combined), and the coverage rate dropped significantly,
to a mere 14 percent and 10 percent, respectively.7 This inconsistent counting method
renders comparisons of statistics from year to year very difficult, even though the reports are
required to contain the same information.
Furthermore, the Compliance Program freely acknowledges—and the enforcement statistics
clearly demonstrate—that the vast majority of inspection and monitoring activities are
not physical on-site inspections.8 Instead MDE relies on self-reporting by the regulated
community. While these reports are an important part of environmental enforcement,
they can never substitute for physical inspections. The reports may be fraudulent or fail to
include important information; they do not account for unpermitted activities; and DMRs
represent only the extent to which sources complied with their discharge limits, but not
other important obligations, such as compliance with schedules for construction of new
pollution control techniques.
In 2005, a federal court indicated that paper reviews of self-monitoring reports are
insufficient to assure compliance under an analogous federal environmental act. This
court struck down a rule issued under the Clean Air Act that governed the scope of the
Act’s new source review permit program based on EPA’s implicit assumption that sources
are trustworthy and will provide accurate information that is relevant to determining their
compliance status.9 The court concluded that EPA took inadequate steps to verify the
accuracy of the information supplied by regulated sources on their compliance status.
Thus, relying on agency review of paper records submitted by regulated entities, without
follow-ups in the form of on-site inspections, is an inadequate response to an increase in
the number of permits issued. Instead, agency personnel and resources must keep pace as
the scope of regulated programs expands so that on-the-ground inspections are conducted
with regularity. Any other result is sure to result in slippage in the form of lower compliance
rates.
Finally, the annual enforcement reports from 2006-2009 contain considerably less
information, self-evaluation, and explanations of the statistics than in previous years.
Including this information would help make the data more understandable and benefit
both MDE, by providing the opportunity to explain any discrepancies, and the public, by
enhancing the transparency of agency enforcement activity.
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Interview Findings
To better understand how enforcement works on the ground, CPR conducted a series of
interviews with Maryland stakeholders to determine how they perceive MDE’s enforcement
program and to help identify strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in enforcement. CPR
requested interviews with 20 stakeholders who represent a diverse group of current and
former government officials, members of the regulated community, and public interest
groups. Of the 20 individuals or organizations with which CPR requested interviews, four
declined or did not respond. Their views are not included. The findings below are drawn
from interviews with the remaining 16 stakeholders.
Collectively these interviewees have decades of enforcement experience in federal, state,
and local government levels, in the regulated sector, and in the public interest community.
Eleven of the participants are attorneys by training, and their past and current experience
covers both prosecuting and defending environmental enforcement cases at all levels. The
interview participants were thus able to provide an expert and holistic view of MDE’s
enforcement program, drawing on their past and current experiences.
The stakeholders interviewed include:
• Jane Barrett, Associate Professor and Director, University of Maryland Environmental Law Clinic, and former Attorney, Environmental Crimes Unit, OAG, and
former Chief, Environmental Litigation, and Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of
Maryland;
• Valerie Connelly, Director of Government Relations, Maryland Farm Bureau;
• James L. Hearn, Environmental Legislative Support, Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, and former Director, Water Management Administration, MDE;
• Brad Heavner, State Director, Environment Maryland;
• Robert Hoyt, Director, Montgomery County Department of Environmental Protection, and former Assistant Secretary, MDE;
• Jonas Jacobson, Director, Baltimore County Department of Environmental Protection and Resource Management, and former Deputy Secretary, MDE;
• Steven Johnson, Principal Counsel to MDE, OAG;
• Tina Meyers, Fellow, University of Maryland Environmental Law Clinic;
• Jonathan Mueller, Director of Litigation, Chesapeake Bay Foundation and former
Senior Attorney, Environmental Enforcement Section, U.S. Department of Justice;
• Jennifer Peterson, Attorney, Environmental Integrity Project;
• Eliot Powell, President, Whitehall Development, Inc., & President, Maryland
Homebuilders Association;
• Michael Powell, Member, Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander,
LLC, and former Principal Counsel to MDE, OAG;
• Dusty Rood, Principal, Rodgers Consulting;
• Eric Schaeffer, Executive Director, Environmental Integrity Project and former
Director, Office of Civil Enforcement, U.S. EPA;
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•
•

Larry Simns,

President, Maryland Watermen’s Association; and
Executive Director, Baltimore Harbor Waterkeeper.

Eliza Smith Steinmeier,

Interview requests were also sent to the following individuals, who declined to participate or
did not respond:
• Jerome Blask, General Counsel, Washington Sanitary Sewer Commission (declined);
• Deborah Jennings, Partner and Chair, Environmental Practice Group, DLA Piper
(did not respond);
• Kendl Philbrick, former Secretary, MDE (unavailable); and
• Bill Satterfield, Executive Director, Delmarva Poultry Industry, Inc. (declined, citing “little involvement with MDE enforcement programs and actions and therefore
little knowledge of most of the [interview] questions…. I am safe in saying that our
members prefer a cooperative, incentive-based program to achieve environmental
improvements rather than an enforcement emphasis”).
CPR provided a draft copy of this report to MDE and met with MDE enforcement staff
and personnel to discuss their response to the report. MDE’s response is included at the
end of this report. CPR met with the following MDE staff:
• Sue Battle-McDonald, Director, BayStat;
• Andrew Godsen, Lead Editor of Annual Reports;
• Jack Bowen, Manager, Regulatory Programs, WMA;
• Dave Lyons, Program Manager, Compliance Program, WMA; and
• Terri Wilson, Director, Office of Budget & Finance.
The findings below are a narrative synthesis of all the interviews CPR conducted in January
and February 2010. The interviewees do not necessarily endorse any of the recommendations made in this report, which are the authors’ alone. The interviewees also participated
and spoke on their own behalf and not on behalf of the agency or organization for which
they work. Interviewees are identified as follows: “official,” for former and current governmental officials, “environmental,” for representatives from environmental and public interest
groups, and “industry,” for representatives from the regulated community.
CPR asked interviewees a series of open-ended questions about MDE’s enforcement
program, including the role of MDE enforcement actions and citizen suits, the deterrent
effect of the different types of enforcement, and recommendations for changing the
enforcement program. As noted earlier, interviewees were told that their specific remarks
would not be attributed to them personally.
Interviewees generally reached a consensus that resource limitations have hindered MDE’s
enforcement program and OAG’s ability to pursue cases referred to it by MDE. They
also tended to agree that criminal enforcement should be increased for particularly willful
and egregious violations when a criminal law is clearly violated. Interviewees disagreed on
many other issues, however, including the institutional and permitting aspects of MDE’s
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enforcement program, the nature of MDE’s enforcement approach and actions, the role and
effectiveness of citizen suits in enforcement, and the role of EPA.
Evaluations of MDE’s Enforcement Program
Evaluations of the reasons for weaknesses in the enforcement program fell into four broad
categories: resource limitations on enforcement; institutional limitations on enforcement;
permits as the basis of enforcement; and the nature of enforcement actions taken by MDE.

All interviewees agreed that MDE should have the primary responsibility for
enforcement of Clean Water Act requirements in Maryland with citizen suits and
EPA taking a secondary role, if any.
As one official said, “MDE needs to enforce the rules on the books. If there is a violation,
the regulated community needs to know that the violator will be caught.” Another
official likened enforcement and compliance to “having a child. Children will try to push
boundaries of what’s acceptable or appropriate. Because [enforcement] comes down to
money, businesses and even local governments will push the issue until they are caught.”
When asked about the role of enforcement efforts in restoring the Chesapeake Bay, two
interviewees expressed similar concerns. They both felt that the current enforcement
program is limited. One industry interviewee noted that existing regulations do not cover
all the sources of pollution, and the other, an official, noted that laws alone will not clean up
the Bay. This person said, “Enforcement can only ensure that the law is enforced, but there
will never be enough laws—nor would the public want all the laws—required to clean up the
Bay.”
Resource Limitations

Nearly all interviewees lamented the lack of financial resources available to MDE
and empathized with existing personnel who are being asked to do more with less
money.
One industry interviewee pointed out a basic dilemma: Maryland “can’t keep diverting
resources and adding more statutory requirements and expect things to improve.” Another
complained that funding for a regulatory or assistance program often disappears as priorities
change, sometimes leaving a functioning, effective program without the resources to
continue. An industry interviewee said, “They’re stealing from [an older] program to fund a
new program because it is the flavor of the day.”
Another environmental interviewee pushed back by suggesting that if MDE has no
resources, the costs of compliance should be allocated to the regulated community. This
interviewee noted that it does not cost MDE anything more to “hold the line until industry
does all its requirements,” meaning that MDE could withhold permits or permit approvals
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until industry comes into compliance without expending any financial resources. Another
environmental interviewee said, “It doesn’t cost any more to make a good permit than a bad
one.”

A majority of interviewees also cited the need to increase both permit fees and
penalties to help cover the costs of MDE’s enforcement program.
“That’s the single
biggest change
they need—more
people out in the
field going from
place to place,”
said one industry
interviewee.
Another said that
more inspectors
would paradoxically
benefit industry
by allowing MDE
the resources
to distinguish
between the good
guys and the bad
guys, instead of
”the tendency to

As one environmental interviewee said, “In general penalties are pretty low and that’s a
national problem. Penalties need to be predictable and regular.” Another official remarked,
“Judges have enormous discretion to impose fines that are too low.” One environmental
interviewee suggested that Maryland pass mandatory minimum penalty laws.

Nearly all interviewees expressed dismay at the lack of inspectors and the lack of
inspections in MDE’s enforcement program and cited a need to increase both.  
One industry interviewee observed that population growth in Maryland means an increase
in pollution problems, which requires more inspectors. Another official echoed this
observation, finding that reduced personnel have not been replaced and that the budget
situation is “not good.” Another industry interviewee felt that a fully staffed enforcement
workforce would “paradoxically” benefit the regulated community because more inspectors
would allow MDE to distinguish more easily between the “good guys” and the “bad guys”
instead of the “tendency to overreach in the first go-round.”
Regarding inspections, one official said that, unless MDE receives a complaint, there are
“very infrequent site visits.” Site visits are an important component of the enforcement
program because, as this official complained, there are “too many instances of fraudulent
[discharge monitoring reports],” which cannot be discovered without site visits.
To address these problems, one industry interviewee said, “That is the single biggest
change they need—more people out in the field going from place to place.” This statement
was echoed by nearly every interviewee. Recognizing that the “work of agency staff is
complicated and technically challenging,” one environmental interviewee suggested that
MDE needs resources to “retain capable staff.” Although there “are definitely some,” MDE
must have the financial ability to retain inspectors so that they “hang in there.”

overreach in the

Institutional Limitations

first go-round.”

Interviewees expressed a range of opinions on the institutional challenges to enforcement,
assessing in different ways the political will and leadership to enforce, the relationships
between MDE and stakeholders, and the appropriateness of MDE’s mentality and attitude
toward citizen suits.

Interviewees disagreed on the political will at MDE to pursue robust enforcement
policies. Industry interviewees generally thought that MDE’s current leadership is
strong, while officials and environmental interviewees had more negative reactions.  
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Two interviewees found Maryland’s enforcement program to be average when
compared to other states.
A few interviewees assessed the political leadership under Governor Martin O’Malley and
Secretary Shari Wilson as strong. “In Maryland, we don’t suffer from weak enforcement
or lack of political will,” said an industry interviewee. Another environmental interviewee
felt that MDE is “making an honest effort at using their limited resources wisely.” Most
interviewees agreed that MDE’s current enforcement program is a big improvement over
that of Governor O’Malley’s recent predecessors, Bob Ehrlich and Parris Glendening.
One official noted the difference in enforcement activities between the administrations of
different political parties, noting more enforcement under Democratic administrations than
Republican administrations. An industry interviewee said the program has been “proactive
and understandable” with a “clear uptick” in the last two to four years.
Others expressed disappointment with the current enforcement program, noting that they
had higher hopes with Governor O’Malley taking office. One environmental interviewee
attributed the decline in enforcement to “a problem at the top,” saying that the secretary
and governor “don’t want enforcement against industry or agriculture or to create stronger
regulations.” While admitting that the lack of resources and funding and the overall budget
crunch are “legitimate problems,” this interviewee declared, “There is a lack of political will
from the top.”
At least two interviewees explicitly compared MDE’s enforcement program to other states’
enforcement programs. One environmental interviewee described MDE’s enforcement
program as “middle of the pack—slightly under par,” while an official evaluated the
program more positively, noting the “considerably higher” number of violations flagged for
formal enforcement actions. The environmental interviewee said, “MDE’s website isn’t as
sophisticated or … transparent [as] other states’ websites. The right-to-know shouldn’t be a
big issue in Maryland, and the permits and violations data should be there: easy to read and
access.”

“The Bay
restoration effort
has been going
on for so long
now, and there’s a
mentality that
there’s nothing
that will help
all that much,
so just plug
away and be
satisfied,” said
one environmental
interviewee.

One environmental interviewee remarked that Maryland has a mobile, highly educated
population and lots of wealth. Its enforcement program “should be better than other states
with higher poverty rates and concentrated industries that wield a lot of political clout.
Maryland doesn’t have the same excuses and prides itself on being very progressive. Our
enforcement program doesn’t match the demographics and politics of the state.”
One official noted that the Chesapeake Bay is a driver for enforcement because it gives
MDE and Maryland a higher profile than other regions with less famous or less historically
important waterways. Yet another environmental interviewee said that the long history of
Bay restoration was an obstacle to an active and vigorous enforcement program. “The Bay
restoration effort has been going on for so long now, and there’s a mentality that there’s
nothing that will help all that much, so just plug away and be satisfied.”
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Interviewees had different and contrasting opinions on MDE’s relationships with
the regulated community and with public interest groups and their impacts on
enforcement. Both industry and environmental interviewees expressed suspicion
that MDE favors the other side. Both environmental and industry interviewees
recommended a more inclusive decision-making process.
In one environmental interviewee’s experience, “the bias of the permit writers is to give in to
the industry.” This interviewee suggested that MDE should chart a middle course between
environmental groups and the regulated community so that the agency is not “caving to
industry all the time.” Another environmental interviewee described a meeting where MDE
asked for the opinion of the regulated community on minimum standards for a permit,
instead of presenting the regulated community with its own standards and soliciting input.
In contrast, other interviewees felt that public interest groups have a closer relationship
with MDE than the regulated community. One official said that under Governor O’Malley
and Secretary Wilson, MDE is “very sensitive to environmental groups.” Another added
that the relationship between MDE and the regulated community is “distrustful, not
cooperative,” and “very adversarial.” Another industry interviewee presented a less negative
evaluation, noting that MDE’s relationship with the regulated community varies by site. This
interviewee has never seen “a single instance of MDE letting [a polluter] off easy.” Another
industry interviewee described the “crystal palace effect,” meaning that MDE operates
“off in a separate world. If there was more open communication … there may be clearer
guidelines, [which] could lead to less infractions.” And, “The more they distance themselves
from the regulated community, the more ignorance there will be on both parties’ parts, and
greater opportunity for violations.”
According to one environmental interviewee, MDE needs a reminder that “they are
working for the benefit of the health of citizens and resources, not at the behest of industry
stakeholders.” Another environmental interviewee noted that people have low confidence
in government. By taking strong action and making their enforcement presence known,
MDE can increase the effectiveness of their actions. “The public isn’t against enforcement,
but MDE is afraid of giving Maryland an anti-business reputation. Law-abiding businesses
should be happier to have a consistent playing field.”

Several interviewees described challenges posed by an institutional culture at MDE
that is threatened by citizen suits.  
One environmental interviewee described an ingrained mentality that “citizen suits are a
threat.” Another attributed this mentality in part to recent activity by citizens to become
more active, unlike in the past. This interviewee said, “The more that citizen groups
participate, the more likely it is that the bureaucratic obstacles will improve.” Citizen suits
are discussed in further detail in the next section.
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The Permitting Program

Several interviewees across the board emphasized the need for a stronger permitting
program, citing weak or unclear permits as a major source of confusion for everyone
affected by enforcement and compliance efforts.  A few interviewees recommended
strengthening the permitting program by writing stronger permits and increasing
legal review of permits by the OAG, discussed below.
One environmental interviewee described the permitting program as the “keystone of the
enforcement program” and the “teeth of the clean water restoration program.” Another
industry interviewee said that weak permits are a source of frustration for both the
regulated community and public interest groups. Weak permits “shield certain sectors from
enforcement action.” This industry interviewee noted that permits that are not “written
clearly enough to determine if a violation has occurred” are “one of the major complaints
and frustrations.”
Interviewees gave similar explanations for the weakness in MDE’s permitting program: a
lack of internal staff training, the lack of resources, the inability to retain skilled personnel,
and the lack of input and review from the OAG. One environmental interviewee said that
MDE staff “scratch their heads because they simply aren’t aware of the requirements.”
Another official noted that there is currently “greater sensitivity to writing an effective
permit.”
At least two industry interviewees disagreed with the general evaluation of MDE’s
permitting program. One observed that the regulations and enforcement have both changed
significantly over the past decade, resulting in an overall tightening of restrictions, more
stringent permit requirements, and greater review of permits. The other interviewee, while
allowing that permitting is “an area where [MDE] could improve,” clarified that “unclear
permits are the exception and not the rule.”
An official and an environmental interviewee expressed their concerns about the permit
shield defense stemming from the CWA and recommended that MDE clarify the extent
of the shield. The permit shield defense arises from section 402(k) of the CWA. Under
this provision, a discharger’s compliance with its NPDES permit is regarded as compliance
with all of the source’s legal obligations under the Clean Water Act. In 2001, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to which Maryland belongs, held that discharges
of pollutants not explicitly listed in the NPDES permit but “within the reasonable
contemplation of the permitting authority at the time the permit was issued” were also
covered by the permit shield. This ruling is troublesome because it undermines the intent of
the CWA, which requires a permit for the discharge of all pollutants.
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The Nature of MDE’s Enforcement Actions

Interviewees also expressed opinions on different aspects of MDE’s enforcement actions,
including the preferred type of enforcement action; the method of MDE enforcement; the
assessment of penalties; the gaps in enforcement; and the impartiality of state courts.
The Type of Enforcement Action: Cooperative or Deterrent

Interviewees generally agreed that MDE should maintain both a cooperative and a
traditional, deterrence-based enforcement program and that the form of enforcement
should be tailored to the violation.  A handful of interviewees said that MDE should
engage in cooperative efforts to educate the regulated community about applicable
regulations.
When asked about the types of enforcement that MDE uses—informal, cooperative
enforcement or formal, traditional deterrence-based enforcement—interviewees generally
agreed that the type of enforcement action should depend on the nature of the violation.
They said that MDE should distinguish between repeat or willful violations and firsttime violators. A few environmental interviewees recommended that Maryland establish
chronic violator laws that authorize higher penalties and consequences for repeat offenders.
First-time violations that MDE can catch early “should be cooperatively brought into
compliance.” But most felt that MDE should maintain the traditional deterrence-based
approach. As one official declared, “Cooperative enforcement should not ever replace
[traditional enforcement].” Another observed that MDE is doing less compliance counseling
than in the past and is pursuing mandatory enforcement actions for any significant
violations.
Most industry interviewees preferred cooperative enforcement and thought MDE could
improve by educating the regulated community about applicable regulations. One industry
interviewee said, “Most companies are ignorant and careless. You can usually fix the
problem by telling them what they are doing is stupid. They are careless and not paying
attention.” As an industry interviewee observed, for the most part regulated entities are
inclined to comply, but there will always be a few that “thumb their nose at the law.”
The Method of MDE Enforcement: Spotlights or Sweeps

A few interviewees criticized MDE’s method of spotlight enforcement, or pursuing a
few major violations rather than engaging in consistent and uniform sector sweeps.
As one industry interviewee explained, “There’s better ways to enforce.” This interviewee
analogized the enforcement program to the enforcement of speed limits. “You can have
lots of police who catch lots of speeders and write lots of small tickets. Or you can have
a few police, catch a few speeders, and shoot them.” This analogy was echoed by at least
three other industry interviewees. They expressed frustration that MDE uses the second
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strategy—a few major enforcement cases with severe penalties, “an exaggerated response to
a particular situation.” According to one, this strategy is “not the best way to do it.”
Some interviewees suggested that instead of focusing on a few violators and assessing
large fines, MDE should pick one area and flood it with inspectors and have progressive
fines for repeat violations. An environmental interviewee echoed this idea of enforcement
sweeps by sector. In this interviewee’s experience, this type of sweep “tends to get a high
response rate, and those who fail to respond become less sympathetic and more vulnerable
to enforcement.”

Others complained that MDE fails to take advantage of citizen suits and often acts
too slowly.
Several interviewees criticized MDE’s unwillingness to fully utilize citizen suits to
supplement enforcement and relieve the agency of the burden of carrying the full
enforcement load. One industry interviewee also criticized MDE for acting too slowly,
citing the time delay between reporting a violation and the arrival of MDE inspectors at the
site. By the time the inspectors arrive, this interviewee said, “The pollution has stopped,”
adding that sometimes it feels like MDE “tips off the polluters.”

“You can have lots
of police who catch
lots of speeders
and write lots of
small tickets. Or

The Assessment of Penalties

you can have

Some interviewees lamented the low penalties assessed by MDE and their negligible
impact on deterrence.

a few police,

Among some interviewees, there is a perception that MDE sets penalties at levels that
are not sufficient to create an effective deterrent to noncompliance, causing the regulated
community to view those penalties as the necessary “cost of doing business,” to be regarded
no differently than payroll, equipment purchase, and other ongoing costs. In response, one
industry interviewee said that this mentality operates on a case-by-case basis. “There will
always be a few that would rather pay the fine than pay for the upgrades.” Another industry
interviewee categorically denied that regulated companies calculate MDE enforcement
penalties as the cost of doing business. Considering the legal fees and the public relations
impact, regulated entities “clearly never make money” from a deliberate violation.

speeders, and

catch a few
shoot them,”
said one industry
interviewee.

Another industry interviewee echoed that position, finding that MDE retains a “powerful
hammer” in imposing penalties. This interviewee observed that fines, stop-work orders, and
bad publicity all work effectively to ensure compliance. “No one wants to be in the public
eye or have work stopped.” This interviewee has seen some regulated facilities that are
“extremely paranoid about compliance,” since bad publicity and MDE enforcement actions
are equal “black eyes” that the regulated community strives to avoid.
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The Gaps in Enforcement

When asked which, if any, sectors MDE overlooks in its enforcement actions,
responses naturally reflected the particular interests of the interviewees.  However,
most interviewees agreed that agriculture is an overlooked sector and that MDE
should have greater authority to inspect farms.
One industry interviewee distinguished between sectors and types of pollution problems.
This interviewee did not think that any sector is overlooked, but opined that difficult
pollution problems are being overlooked. A few officials echoed this opinion, citing
pollution problems from facilities that are large local employers or that contribute
significantly to the local economy. As one official said, “There is a reluctance to use taxpayer
funds to penalize these sources.” An environmental interviewee countered that industry too
often “plays the recession card,” claiming enforcement and new regulations will cost jobs.
One industry interviewee clarified that MDE does not overlook any sectors, but it is the
lack of resources that prevents MDE from getting to some sectors on a timely basis. A
few also expressed a desire to see enforcement efforts in proportion to a sector’s pollution
contribution.
Most interviewees specified agriculture as the one sector that MDE overlooks. One
environmental interviewed declared, “Agriculture is the most ridiculously unregulated
and unenforced sector.” “It is ridiculous that MDA should be made the enforcers [for
agriculture]—they should shift it to MDE.” This interviewee described the dynamic
between MDA and MDE on CAFO enforcement as “antagonistic.” Another official also
questioned the appropriateness of vesting in MDA enforcement authority over nutrient
management plans, discussed earlier in the CAFO section. This interviewee felt that MDA is
“not qualified to make decisions about how much nutrients can go into the Bay.”
The Impartiality of State Courts

At least five officials and environmental interviewees agreed that state courts
were not the ideal venue to hear civil or criminal environmental enforcement
actions.  Some officials preferred administrative hearings, and some environmental
interviewees expressed a preference for citizen suits because they are heard in federal
court.
As one official said, “State courts and judges are less knowledgeable and are more tied to
their communities, meaning they are less independent. If the citizen suit alleges violations
against an influential entity, bringing a case in state court can be problematic.” Another
environmental interviewee observed that state courts are “somewhat hostile to intervention”
by citizen groups in state court. Another is “baffled” by the state court system and said
that the U.S. Attorney’s Office complains “bitterly” about the quality of state court judges.
“Some cases you can’t get anywhere in state court. You need to be in federal court.”
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Another official said that state court judges are “unbelievably predisposed to defendants”
and “hostile to MDE.” This interviewee expressed a personal lack of confidence in the state
court system, and no confidence that state courts are impartial. Officials and environmental
interviewees preferred federal courts because there are higher penalties and more objective,
independent judges.
One official recommended that MDE take more actions to court, rather than
administratively settling them, because the penalties and judgments are greater in courts
and administrative settlements are “quick and easy” for violators. This recommendation
contrasted with another official, who cited the administrative courts’ deference to the agency
as a significant factor in favor of administrative courts. In this person’s opinion, despite the
lower administrative penalty caps and the potentially stronger message that judicial actions
might send, administrative hearings may still be preferable because the administrative judges
have specific knowledge about environmental regulations, are more neutral, and are more
deferential to MDE than state courts.
The Role, Impact, and Effectiveness of Citizen Suits

While interviewees generally agreed on MDE’s role in enforcement, views on the
role of citizen suits in enforcement were not as cohesive and, indeed, were often
diametrically opposed.  Nearly equal numbers of interviewees expressed support
for citizen suits as an additional resource for MDE enforcement efforts as those who
expressed skepticism about the value and usefulness of these suits.
Those who favored the use of citizen suits, including environment and some government
officials, described them as “a critical piece of the enforcement tool set,” a “check and
balance,” and a “helpful [way to] to drive action and policy.” From prior experience, one
environmental interviewee stated, “When industry realizes citizens are out there keeping
watch, too, citizen suits are more effective.” Another environmental interviewee said that
citizen suits are an “essential component” because enforcement resources “are always going
to be strained.” Another industry interviewee expressed a more neutral view, acknowledging
“there are instances where the threat of citizen suits can serve as a deterrent, but [they]
shouldn’t be used arbitrarily because it wastes a lot of resources by all parties.”
One environmental interviewee suggested that MDE would be “so much better off to admit
no resources,” so that it could accept the help of citizen groups without embarrassment or
impacting citizens’ faith in government.
Among those who were more skeptical about the role of citizen suits, one industry
interviewee likened the impact of citizen suits to “putting a grain of sand on the beach
to make it bigger.” “Citizen suits are overrated as a tool for significant change.” Another
industry interviewee commented that citizen suits “affect the timing [of an enforcement
action] but seldom change the outcome.” This interviewee explained that a citizen suit
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notice may force MDE to act faster than it would without the notice, but ultimately MDE is
“not likely to take any action that it wouldn’t have taken anyway.”

Some interviewees observed that MDE is reluctant to allow citizen suits to proceed.  
The perceived reasons for this stance differed. Some interviewees expressed a sense
that MDE feels obligated to pursue, on its own, environmental violations brought
to its attention. Others suggested an institutional mentality that citizen suits
embarrass MDE because they imply that MDE is not protecting public health and
the environment, as is its duty under the law.
One official observed that traditionally MDE has not viewed citizen suits as a supplement to
MDE’s enforcement efforts because, from MDE’s perspective, if the citizen suit identifies
a violation and that violation is causing an environmental impact, it is MDE’s obligation
to enforce the law. This interviewee added, “[MDE] won’t sit by and let citizens take the
responsibility of enforcing the law.” An environmental interviewee said that the options to
address citizen suits are to “deny the problem, or own the case and take over.”
Another environmental interviewee expressed a somewhat different interpretation,
recounting conversations where MDE staff “said that they can’t let citizens bring lawsuits
because it gives the perception that they are not doing their job…. They don’t want that
message out there to lose public support.” Another described an ingrained mentality at
MDE that “citizen suits are a threat.” This combined perception of embarrassment and
reputation was echoed by other interviewees, who added that MDE even feels threatened by
citizen suits.
Yet another environmental interviewee stated more bluntly, “The number one impediment
to citizen suits being effective is the hostility [by MDE] to citizen suits.” Another had the
impression that MDE has the “erroneous assumption that by going to federal court they
forgo penalties awarded to the state.”

Interviewees generally agreed that the regulated community strongly dislikes and
does not support citizen suits as a means of enforcement. Opinions differed,
however, regarding the impact of citizen suits on the regulated community’s
behavior.  
One industry interviewee observed that industry perceives citizen suits as complicating
compliance because they “make it difficult to work things out.” Having a citizen group
at the negotiating table “makes the landscape more difficult,” even if the regulated
facility has already agreed to certain actions to come into compliance. Another industry
interviewee views citizen suits “with hostility. There aren’t any citizen groups out there that
[this industry] would view as working in the joint interest of [this industry] and the Bay.”
Another environmental interviewee has the impression that industry views citizen groups as
“ambulance chasers” and “loose cannons filing lawsuits willy-nilly.”
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Another industry interviewee said fellow colleagues perceive citizen suits as “witch hunts”
and are more concerned about “being falsely accused” than they are deterred by the
potential of citizen suits. They are concerned that “a layman would lay blame unnecessarily.”
This interviewee “would gladly pay more taxes for the police to hand out speeding tickets”
or analogously “have more MDE people handing out violations” than citizens. This
interviewee distinguished between citizen groups that are truly trying to clean up the Bay and
others that “are just trying to stop growth.”

A few interviewees cited the public perception of citizen suits as obstacles to
enforcement.
One environmental interviewee observed that the public misunderstands the formal legal
processes behind citizen suits and that the public perception of citizen suits is framed by
industry “crying about crazy people and that these actions should be the role of the state
instead.” This interviewee explained that citizen suits work by alleging facts to the best
of their knowledge, and “the facts may or may not be correct, but that is how the process
works…. Motions [in court] would get to the bottom of the issue.”
An official acknowledged the public perception of citizen suits as a “political tool” for
public interest groups to get membership, raise their profile, or get more donations by filing
“what you could call frivolous lawsuits.” Two interviewees refuted this perception. As one
environmental interviewee stated, “The truth is, the risk of losing a citizen suit is so high.
The only way to file is with pro bono or contingency lawyers. Groups must pay lots of fees
and experts, and possibly the fees of the defense’s experts. For small public interest groups,
a loss could kill them. They don’t have the luxury of filing a politically guided case.”

Regardless of their view about the use of citizen suits in enforcement efforts,
interviewees agreed that citizen suits play a useful role in bringing violations to
MDE’s attention and educating the public about both regulations and behavior
changes.
Many interviewees echoed the sentiment that citizen groups can act as watchdogs and are
helpful in bringing information to MDE and other state agencies. A few interviewees noted,
however, that sometimes citizen groups identify violations that MDE is already pursuing,
and it would be more helpful for these groups to identify smaller violations that are beyond
MDE’s resources to monitor.
The Role of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General

Interviewees attributed some enforcement problems to the Office of the Attorney
General (OAG), citing a lack of resources and institutional culture. Other
interviewees cited the need for greater OAG review of permits before they are issued.  
Interviewees had different evaluations of the OAG. One industry interviewee said, “The
Attorney General has done a lot of enforcement public relations, but they don’t have the
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resources to carry out their mandate.” Another official had the impression that lawyers in
the OAG “don’t like going to court.” This interviewee criticized the quality of the legal
work and found that cases “weren’t always pursued as diligently as they could’ve been.”
At least two interviewees emphasized the need for the OAG to review permits for legal
issues before they are issued. According to one environmental interviewee, “the OAG
seems surprised when issues of legality are raised.” Another environmental interviewee
commented that if the OAG is “going to have to defend state decisions, they need to have a
more active role in reviewing the legality of permits.” This interviewee acknowledged that
the OAG cannot review every permit but that “some are getting through that are clearly
illegal.”
This perspective was refuted by one official, who explained that some groups may feel that
“MDE’s permits aren’t as environmentally protective as they could be, but the permits are
legally sustainable. It’s not the OAG’s role to say to MDE, ‘Be tougher.’”
The Role of Criminal Enforcement

Nearly every participant thought that MDE and the OAG should pursue criminal
enforcement actions when a discharger has committed a willful or flagrant violation
of the law. Opinions as to the effectiveness of criminal enforcement actions in
achieving deterrence varied. Some interviewees said that more criminal actions
would send a clear message.  Others had difficulty evaluating the deterrent effect
of such actions when cases are so difficult to establish and civil penalties are much
higher than they are in criminal cases.
Interviewees’ opinions on criminal enforcement actions were fairly similar: “Criminal action
should be used in major violations and where there is absolutely no effort to comply, or even
where there is an effort to comply if the magnitude of the violation warrants.”
However, evaluations of the current criminal enforcement program differed. One
environmental interviewee said, “Currently there is no criminal enforcement to speak of,”
and the cases brought today are “petty, and no comparison to the caliber of cases brought
years ago.” An industry interviewee disagreed, finding that generally MDE and the OAG do
a “pretty good job.” An environmental interviewee echoed this opinion and added that the
OAG has worked with public interest groups to train them to spot criminal activities. This
interviewee added that the OAG seems willing to work with citizens and to bring actions, but
it is “even more resource-strapped than MDE” and not necessarily lacking in political will.
Others concurred with the lack of resources at the Environmental Crimes Unit.
At least half of the interviewees of different backgrounds agreed that criminal enforcement
actions should be increased. However, one industry interviewee feared “that through
draconian measures, criminal penalties could apply to those that violate out of ignorance,
and not flagrant violation of the rules.”
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Other interviewees expressed doubts on the effectiveness of criminal enforcement.
“Criminal cases are hard to use to build a deterrence-based program. Opportunities are
hard to uncover and require a high level of proof.” An industry interviewee added that
“people have become more sophisticated” and “think they can get away with it,” finding that
environmental crimes tend to be done by small-time operators, involving lead or asbestos
removal. “Big companies do the equation; they don’t want to go to jail.” An official found it
difficult to “evaluate the deterrence impact of a million dollar civil penalty versus a $20,000
criminal fine.”
Among those most supportive of increased criminal enforcement actions were two
environmental interviewees who said that criminal enforcement actions should make up only
a small part, perhaps 1 percent, of enforcement actions. Others noted additional obstacles
to establishing successful criminal cases, including the difficulty of proving criminal intent.
In addition, “most juries are reluctant to prosecute unless they know that the person was
aware of their conduct and had specific intent.” One environmental interviewee observed
a reluctance of state courts to view environmental crimes as the same as other, more typical
crimes such as robbery. In one instance, “the judge was very uncomfortable listening to [an
environmental] case after hearing a case about cigarette theft.”
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“The folks at MDE
live with their
constituents—EPA
doesn’t,” said
one industry
interviewee.

The Role of the Environmental Protection Agency

Interviewees generally characterized the relationship between MDE and EPA
as difficult.  Many saw room for EPA to contribute to state resources or to assist
with permit review, but most agreed that MDE would push back —out of fear or
hostility—against federal involvement with its enforcement program.
Interviewees cited similar reasons for MDE and EPA’s difficult relationship, including
MDE’s concerns about its authority “to make the calls,” its fear that EPA will take away
its delegation, and its general territoriality over “the sexy cases.” One environmental
interviewee characterized the situation as one in which “MDE is afraid to work with EPA on
greater penalties,” even though the chances of success are much higher in federal court.
One industry interviewee “strongly opposed” EPA involvement, citing strong laws in
Maryland. This person said, “The folks at MDE live with their constituents—EPA doesn’t.”
When asked about what role EPA could play, interviewees cited greater oversight,
consultation, and funding. Others cited assistance with particular sectors like agriculture and
stormwater where Maryland “won’t have the ability or political will to do the job.”
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Recommendations
This report highlights a series of fundamental weaknesses in the enforcement of Clean
Water Act requirements in Maryland. Foremost is the serious decline in resources over the
past 10 years, and the ultimate lack of financial resources to fill all inspector positions at
MDE and to hire additional enforcement personnel to monitor the nearly 55,000 permits
in effect. Even without additional financial resources, however, MDE could nonetheless
craft an effective enforcement program. This section offers three sets of recommendations
to improve MDE’s enforcement program: overall recommendations; improvements with
existing funds; and improvements with additional funds.
Overarching Recommendations
Funding

The need for greater funding is clear: more work is expected of MDE, but less money is
given to the agency to do it. The budget for the WMA enforcement workforce declined by
25 percent between 2000 and 2009 and the number of active, full-time inspectors decreased
by 12 percent while the number of permits in effect for the entire WMA program tripled.
Meanwhile, during the interviews, stakeholders from different backgrounds reached a
surprising consensus, repeatedly citing the need for more inspectors and more inspections
on the ground. Environmental groups felt that more inspectors would reveal more
violations, while industry interviewees felt that more inspectors would reveal that other
industrial sectors are to blame for ongoing violations and pollution. Both sides agreed that
more inspectors are necessary to develop a steady, judicious, systematic, and fair enforcement
program.
Increased funding could be obtained from more stringent and well-crafted penalties and
legislative authorizations for increases in base funding, permitting fees, and penalties.
•

MDE should seek to recoup the economic benefit achieved by noncompliance from all defendants in an enforcement action.
Currently, penalty considerations under Maryland law are limited to addressing the
harm caused by the violation. However, effective deterrent-based penalties consist
of two parts: one part to address the harm and another to eliminate any economic
benefit derived by the violator from the violation. MDE’s failure to recoup this
latter part effectively undermines the enforcement program’s ability to deter future
violations, especially considering MDE’s low penalty assessments. Enforcement
works when all regulated entities are required to abide by the same laws, and none
gains a financial advantage by violating those laws. By simply focusing on recouping
the cost of the environmental harm or the cost of environmental clean up, regulated
entities may perceive, if they do not already, penalties as the “cost of doing busi-
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ness,” deducted from the overall profit. This result is exactly what the traditional
“rational actor” model for explaining compliance-related behavior predicts for a
weak enforcement regime.
EPA’s penalty calculation uses a calculation model called BEN to compute the
economic benefit to a violator from delaying or avoiding necessary pollution control
measures. MDE should apply this or a similar model in its penalty calculations.
•

The Maryland General Assembly should increase basic funding levels for
MDE and then index those increased levels to the rate of inflation to ensure
steady funding levels.
A well-funded enforcement program should have sufficient funds to support a relatively stable amount of enforcement activities, normal contingencies, and broader
enforcement objectives and goals. At best, MDE should have the resources to
address an increasingly complex and challenging universe of pollutants. In MDE’s
annual enforcement and compliance reports, MDE explains that in certain years
wet weather events caused a diversion of resources from one program to another
so that MDE inspectors could address each overflow report. A well-funded agency
should be able to plan for normal contingencies without having to stretch resources
so thinly.

•

The Maryland General Assembly should authorize an increase in permitting
fees to ensure that the fees cover the basic cost of program administration.  
The legislature should also authorize increased penalties for violations and
should establish mandatory minimum penalties that are not subject to MDE
discretion.
In 2007, the Transition report found that more than two-thirds of the permit and
license fees charged by each department have not been increased in more than 10
years. Discharge permit fees in Maryland should be “based on the anticipated cost
of program activities related to management of discharge to waters of this State.”
For example, the fees for a surface water discharge permit were last raised in 1993.
At the very least, permit fees could be raised in accordance with inflation rates since
1993.
Similarly, maximum civil and administrative penalties in Maryland could also be
adjusted for inflation as the EPA has done. Table 1 shows that EPA’s maximum civil
penalty is now $37,500, whereas Maryland’s maximum penalty for CWA violations is
$10,000, the level at which it was enacted.
Both governmental and environmental interviewees complained repeatedly that
MDE and state court judges have too much discretion in determining the size of
penalties, resulting in low penalties that have little deterrent impact. One governmental interviewee cited an example of a criminal enforcement action in which the
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state court judge gave the defendant a $20 fine. Overall, the low average penalty
amounts indicate that MDE and the OAG are seeking or settling for low penalties.
One way to address this problem is for the Maryland legislature to establish a mandatory minimum penalty (MMP). A report by the Texas Public Interest Research
Group found that MMPs were effective enforcement tools, contributing in New
Jersey to 87-percent and 50-percent decreases, respectively, in pollution discharge
violations and reporting violations. Effective MMPs are characterized by clear definitions of all CWA violations, including pollution discharge and reporting violations;
penalty levels that deter the wealthiest polluters but are fair to small businesses; authorizations for delegated authorities to assess penalties; and prompt assessment and
prompt payment. For example, New Jersey’s MMP classifies dischargers as either
“serious violators” or “significant non-compliers,” and the mandatory minimum
is $1,000 and $5,000, respectively. Reporting violations are $100 per day for each
omission, with a maximum penalty of $50,000 per month.
Enforcement Program Design

As discussed earlier, an effective enforcement program may combine both cooperative and
deterrence-based approaches, but ultimately the deterrence-based component appears to
effect the most compliance with CWA and state water quality laws. A deterrence-based
enforcement program consists of four essential elements: compliance monitoring, timely
initiation of enforcement actions; a mandate to comply; and imposition of adequate
penalties. Both the data review of MDE’s annual enforcement and compliance reports and
the interviews for this report revealed that MDE’s enforcement program falls short of an
effective program design.
•

MDE must stop relying on paper reviews of DMRs as the primary way to set
priorities for physical, on-site inspections.
Many interviewees with different interests expressed the need for more inspectors
and more on-site inspections than MDE currently conducts. At least two officials
pointed out the problem with relying on DMRs: “you have to trust what you get”
but “there are too many incidents of fraudulent DMRs. Inspectors find visible violations.” MDE’s Compliance Program explicitly notes its reliance on DMR reviews.
MDE currently prioritizes permittees based on their risk to the environment and
human health and ranks them according to factors such as the nature of the operation, compliance history, and location of the facility. High-risk permittees are more
likely to be physically inspected. However, MDE should establish an enforcement
program with routine inspections for as many permittees as possible.
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If MDE continues to rely heavily on paper reviews, it should assess stiff penalties
for reporting violations so that regulated entities have every incentive to truthfully
report pollutant discharges.
•

MDE and the OAG should ensure that permits are legally defensible and
meet the statutorily required standards of protectiveness. MDE should also
clarify the extent to which the permit defense shield applies in Maryland.
Enforcement of CWA requirements starts, most basically, with the NPDES pollution discharge permit issued to each regulated entity. Clearly written permits benefit
all stakeholders: the regulated entity, by clearly stating what is and is not permitted,
and the public, by establishing clear standards by which to judge a violation. Unfortunately, during the interviews, a common complaint that emerged was that MDE
issues permits that are unclear and confusing or that fail to meet minimum legal
requirements. Because MDE’s legal counsel will eventually be required to defend
the permits, the OAG should take a greater role in reviewing permits before they
are issued. This preemptive action may reduce the resources later needed to defend
permits or prosecute permit violations. As one environmental interviewee noted,
“It doesn’t cost any more to write a good permit than a bad one!”
In addition, MDE should clarify the extent of the permit shield defense as it applies
in Maryland. Among the possible options, MDE could identify key pollutants that
it identifies as harmful and set permit limits for discharges of those pollutants above
certain amounts. This approach would divest permit-issuing officials of some discretion to determine which pollutants merit limits, but it would relieve the agency of
the responsibility of deciding on a case-by-case basis which pollutants are sufficiently harmful to require limits. It would also provide a baseline level of permit controls
needed to protect the state’s aquatic ecosystems. Alternatively, MDE could identify
key pollutants and require permit applicants to disclose in their permits applications the amounts of those pollutants they plan to discharge. Such disclosure would
allow MDE to use its informed discretion to determine whether to impose limits
and, if so, what those limits should be. Discharge of a listed pollutant without prior
disclosure in the permit would constitute a violation, and perhaps even trigger the
severe penalties that MDE invokes for willful violations.

•

The Maryland General Assembly should increase maximum penalty amounts
for violations of CWA NPDES permits.
Currently, the Clean Water Act authorizes a maximum civil penalty of $37,500 for
NPDES violations, whereas Maryland law authorizes a maximum civil penalty of
$10,000 for the same violations. The General Assembly should authorize a maximum civil penalty that is comparable to the federal maximum.
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•

MDE should not settle for penalties that fail to deter dischargers from violating the applicable laws and regulations.
As noted earlier, between 2000 and 2009 MDE’s average penalty settlement was
far below the maximum amount authorized under the CWA and Maryland law.
Coupled with the relative paucity of inspections, dischargers in Maryland have little
reason to think that they will be caught and, even if caught, that they will be meaningfully penalized.

•

MDE should reevaluate the balance of judicial enforcement actions and
administrative enforcement actions and carefully consider which route is
better, based on factors such as the difference in maximum available penalties or past experience with similar cases or in similar venues. MDE should
also consider allowing citizen suits to proceed in federal court to maximize
penalty recovery and the deterrent effect from strong penalties.
During the interviews, both officials and environmental interviewees described their
perceptions of a strong bias in favor of defendants in state courts and the difficulty
of obtaining a fair trial. MDE should consider this bias when deciding what type of
enforcement action to pursue, either in state court or through the Maryland Office
of Administrative Hearings. MDE should also consider this bias in conjunction
with whether to over-file citizen suits or to let them proceed in federal court.

•

MDE should provide complete information in its annual enforcement and
compliance reports that is necessary for the public to assess the scope and
effectiveness of the agency’s enforcement program.
While the annual Enforcement and Compliance Reports provide great insight into
MDE’s enforcement program, the reports could be improved by ensuring consistent
counting methods and including all enforcement activities. Consistent counting
methods would allow the public to fairly compare MDE’s enforcement efforts in
different years. Including all enforcement activities would allow the public to see
what additional measures are being taken to ensure compliance with the CWA and
may even benefit MDE by revealing a great deal more enforcement than currently
appears in the available data. At a minimum, this information would give a more detailed and holistic view of all enforcement efforts in Maryland. For example, MDE
could include:
• Information on SEPs, including monitoring efforts and evaluations on their
effectiveness;
• Information on repeat violations at previously cited facilities or repeat violators; and
• Information on enforcement activities undertaken by locally delegated authorities.
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Citizen Suits

Citizen suits are an integral and established part of most federal environmental laws and
enforcement programs. They represent an explicit congressional recognition that citizens
have a role to play in enforcement because they and their organizations are able and have
information and resources to monitor local dischargers that MDE may not. MDE seems to
afford inadequate weight to the use of citizen suits as a tool to supplement enforcement.
•

MDE should permit, on a case-by-case basis, citizen suits to proceed in federal court as an established supplementary enforcement mechanism.  MDE
should also work with citizens groups and EPA to channel cases through
federal court to get higher penalties where appropriate.
In determining whether or not to over-file citizen suits—thus effectively preventing
them from proceeding—MDE should consider a variety of factors, including: the
availability of resources to pursue a violation alleged in a citizen suit; whether or
not active enforcement action has already been commenced by MDE, or whether
the suit prompts initiation of an enforcement action; the nature and profile of the
alleged violator; whether allowing the suit to proceed in federal court may be better
than an action by MDE in state court; and the availability of relief or penalty recovery.
MDE retains every right to preempt citizen suits that are brought to its attention by
initiating and diligently prosecuting its own enforcement actions. However, many
environmental interviewees expressed frustration with the inability to pursue any
federal actions and the inability to participate as an intervener in subsequent MDE
actions.

Improvements with Existing Limited Resources
This report confirms a longstanding problem with MDE’s lack of resources and its impact
on enforcement. Clearly, as recommended above, MDE’s enforcement program would
improve dramatically with adequate numbers of inspectors and more on-site inspections, but
MDE can also make a number of improvements even if resources do not increase.
•

MDE should conduct an analysis of the most significant causes of Bay pollution and select and inspect on an annual basis the largest dischargers or a
random sample of discharges in sectors with multiple small dischargers.
Paper reviews of DMRs are an important part of any enforcement program, but
on-site inspections are crucial. They reveal violations that are omitted, not evident,
or concealed in self-reports and enable MDE to better and realistically understand
what actions to enhance compliance are and are not being taken by regulated entities. As part of a targeted, focused enforcement program, MDE should also pursue
a small number of cases to the hilt.
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•

MDE should develop and clearly communicate its enforcement priorities to
the regulated community and to the public and widely and publicly advertise
successful, tough enforcement actions.
One of the most important actions MDE and the political leadership in Maryland
can take is to throw its support behind a strong, vigorous enforcement program.
Especially in times when budgets are tight, political support is a powerful resource
that can help maintain the morale of the enforcement staff and communicate to the
regulated community that violations will be pursued.
While MDE advertises its enforcement actions on its website, the agency should
try to reach a wider public audience by reaching out to local media for coverage of
enforcement actions in the relevant local newspapers and broadcast outlets.

•

Internally, MDE should foster a culture that is supportive of enforcement.
MDE, like all enforcement authorities, often occupies an unenviable position: the
middle. It may receive pressure from the political leadership or other state agencies to pursue or ignore certain cases or sectors; it must interact frequently with the
regulated community, which has its own interests in enforcement; and it is the focal
point of frustration from vigilant and vocal environmental organizations. Given
those pressures and the bleak budget situation, it is not difficult to imagine that
MDE’s enforcement workforce is beleaguered, demoralized, and reluctant to take a
step in any direction for fear of drawing the ire of some stakeholder.
To foster an internal agency culture that emphasizes enforcement, MDE leadership
should continue to demonstrate in words and action that it is committed to enforcing the Clean Water Act as written and intended by Congress. In addition, MDE
is filled with committed, dedicated, and professional enforcement staff, many of
whom could take stronger leadership roles in enforcement and advocate for more
stringent penalties or enforcement actions. MDE should encourage its enforcement
personnel to take on this role. MDE should also provide incentives to maintain
staff morale, including higher pay grades, promotions, and opportunities for continuing professional or advanced education.

Improvements with Additional Funds
MDE’s enforcement program could be better funded if it followed the model of the most
advanced federal programs, which tend to be more aggressive about collecting penalties
that are then channeled back into enforcement. An annual budget appropriation from the
Maryland legislature is still necessary to provide the foundation of the program, but an
effective restructuring of the enforcement program could render it self-supporting. With
more financial resources, MDE could increase its enforcement program in a number of
ways:
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MDE should inspect at the frequency specified by Maryland law and EPA
guidelines.
In 2007, EPA issued inspection frequency goals for the core NPDES programs, as
well as wet weather sources of pollutant discharges.10 For example, as MDE begins
to develop an enforcement program for the new CAFO permit, it should note that
EPA guidelines recommend a 20-percent inspection coverage rate for large CAFOs,
or an inspection at least once every five years. For construction sites, the guidance
recommends a 10-percent inspection rate for sites larger than five acres and a 5-percent inspection rate for sites between one and five acres. MDE’s existing annual
reports do not break down inspection information this specifically, so it cannot be
determined if MDE is meeting these goals.
In addition, Maryland law specifies some inspection frequencies. Under Maryland
law construction sites with approved erosion and sediment control plans must be
inspected on the average of every two weeks. MDE’s annual reports freely concede
inadequate inspections. With additional financial resources, MDE should strive to
meet EPA’s and its own goals for inspection frequencies.

•

MDE should address as many violations as possible with formal civil and
criminal enforcement actions.
The nature of the enforcement actions, deterrent-based or cooperative, impacts the
overall effectiveness of any enforcement program. The rational regulated entity
model appears to support the conclusion that deterrence-based actions are more
likely to ensure lasting and long-term compliance than would result from primary
reliance on cooperative-based enforcement tools. However, MDE should also
consider the nature of the violation in determining which enforcement approach
to apply. First-time violators that self-report violations, for example, may warrant a
cooperative enforcement approach, while repeat or willful first-time violators should
be subject to a strong deterrence-based approach.

•

The OAG should increase its staff seated at MDE to process enforcement
actions in a timely manner.
As of March 2010, MDE is represented by a staff of 24 attorneys from the OAG.
These attorneys are responsible for an enormous amount of cases. While these
attorneys report to the Attorney General, their positions are located within MDE’s
budget. With additional funding, MDE should allocate a larger portion of its budget to hire the additional staff necessary to meet the enforcement caseload.
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•

MDE should reach out to citizens who live near regulated facilities to encourage and educate them to monitor instances of noncompliance.
With more funding, MDE could enlist citizens to assist with compliance monitoring by teaching them how to identify violations to bring to MDE’s attention. One
environmental interviewee commended past efforts by the Environmental Crimes
Unit to reach out to citizens groups in this way. MDE could extend and broaden
this outreach to assist with its monitoring efforts.
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Future Research
This report provides a detailed look at MDE’s enforcement program for CWA requirements.
However, many other questions remain unanswered and would benefit from future research,
including:
•

The average caseload for an inspector or legal counsel. This report identifies
an average 1,184 permits in effect per inspector in the WMA and approximately 24
staff attorneys seated at MDE. It is unclear, however, what a reasonable caseload
for either an inspector or an attorney would be. In California, Delaware, Illinois,
and North Carolina, the average number of permits per inspector is 120. However, it is difficult to compare this number with MDE because in those states the
enforcement data are specific to NPDES permits only, whereas MDE’s information
represents the entire WMA program.

•

The trigger for an onsite inspection. With limited resources, MDE can only inspect a limited number of facilities and permittees. It would be useful to understand
how MDE selects sites for onsite inspections.

•

The amount of money lost from not recovering the violator’s benefit from
noncompliance. EPA’s penalty policy includes a calculation to recover the violator’s economic benefit from noncompliance, which MDE does not include. The
failure to recover this benefit undermines effective deterrence. An illuminating
future research question may be to attempt to calculate the amount lost by failure to
recover this benefit over the past decade.

•

The number of citizen suits overfiled. MDE should release information about
how many citizen suits it has overfiled, and the outcome of those cases compared to
what the citizen suits sought. This information could help determine if and when
MDE should simply allow citizen suits to proceed to maximize penalty recovery and
deterrent effect.

•

The number of facilities that, after notice of a violation, come into compliance within 60 days. This information would indicate in part the effectiveness
of MDE’s enforcement program as a reflection of how seriously a facility regards
potential formal enforcement action.

•

The enforcement activities conducted by locally delegated authorities. Although including these activities is a recommendation made in the report, it is worth
reemphasizing the need for this information and conducting an analysis of these
enforcement activities. The bulk of pretreatment programs are delegated to local
governments, which may be more easily influenced by economically powerful interests and thus have less incentive to enforce strictly against polluters.

•

The enforcement programs in other Bay States. While Maryland has a significant role to play in Bay restoration, the other Bay States, especially Pennsylvania and
Virginia, contribute significant amounts of pollution as well. An important area of
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future research, therefore, would be to conduct similar evaluations of the enforcement programs in those states.
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Conclusion
Maryland has long prided itself on being an environmental leader in the Chesapeake
Bay region, but that pride must come under scrutiny in light of MDE’s enforcement
program. While it is crucial for legislatures and agencies to adopt sufficiently protective
environmental laws, those laws will have little impact if they are not vigorously enforced.
MDE’s enforcement efforts are squeezed to the edge of ineffectiveness by an increasingly
tight budget and a poorly designed program that fails to maximize its deterrent impact.
When inspectors are scarce and on-site inspections even scarcer, the regulated community
internalizes a cavalier attitude that violations will not be discovered. Even if they are
discovered, violators can rest assured that penalties will likely remain low. From the outset,
these two important components of an effective deterrence-based enforcement program—
consistent monitoring and deterrent penalties—are undermined. Worse, citizen suits are
unable to backstop deficiencies in the government’s enforcementa program as a result of
MDE’s reluctance—if not outright hostility—to allowing these suits to proceed.
While MDE’s budget woes are pervasive, MDE can still muster the political resources to
redesign its enforcement program on a limited budget. Strong leadership, dedicated focus
to certain sectors, and tougher penalties are all steps that do not require additional resources.
If the goal is cleaner waters in Maryland and ultimately a restored Chesapeake Bay, the
Maryland Department of the Environment must forcefully and publicly rededicate its
commitment to enforcement.
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Endnotes
1 GAO Report, GAO-10-165T, Clean Water Act:
Longstanding Issues Impact EPA’s and States’ Enforcement
Efforts (Oct. 2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10165t.pdf.
2

GAO Report, GAO-07-883, EPA-State Enforcement
Partnership Has Improved, but EPA’s Oversight Needs Further
Enhancement (July 2007), http: //www.gao.gov/new.items/
d07883.pdf.

3

The citizen suit provisions also authorize suits against
EPA for failure to fulfill its nondiscretionary statutory
duties. This aspect of the citizen suit provision is not the
focus of this report.

9

New York v. U.S. E.P.A., 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

10 EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
The Clean Water Act NPDES Compliance Monitoring Strategy
for the Core Program and Wet Weather Sources (October 2007),
http:// www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/
monitoring/cwa/npdescms.pdf.

4 33 U.C.S. § 1365 (2010).
5

James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in
Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 Widener L. Rev. 1, 30
(2003).

6

Id.

7 Without separating these forms of inspection, the
inspection coverage rates would have been 21 percent and
13 percent, respectively, for FY 2008 and FY 2009.
8 Maryland Department of Environment, FY 2008 Annual
Enforcement and Compliance Report 18 (2009), http://
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Appendix A: Response from MDE
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Appendix B: Response from CPR
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Appendix C: MDE Rebuttal
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